

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

*War & the (Contemporary) World Order: The Legacy of Carl von
Clausewitz*

Bachelor Thesis

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Adam Petrikovič

Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is the work of my own and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and cited in references.

Bratislava, April 30, 2014

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Abstract

This work presents a multidisciplinary, critical analysis of the phenomenon of war. First of all, it attempts to look at the issue through the work of Carl von Clausewitz, whose profound insights into the subject matter articulated in *On War* presents a major paradigm in *modern* warfare and our contemporary understanding of the *art* of war. Furthermore, the work sets to test the validity, relevance of the Clausewitz paradigm in the contemporary world in light of the changing character of war—from *modern* to what could be labelled *post-modern*—namely the conditions of *hypermodern* war and armed conflict—influenced by the progress in science and technology, especially the invention of the nuclear bomb introducing the possibility of a nuclear holocaust—as well as *anti-modern* war—marked by the rise of the *intra-state*, low intensity conflict and irregular warfare rather than *inter-state* conflicts between regular forces. Second of all, the work aims to explore the way in which war, and understanding thereof, influences the constitution of our contemporary world order, as well as the world order in general. Based on the overall understanding of the theoretical, historical, sociological as well as philosophical and metaphysical understanding of the phenomenon of war this work attempts to present a critical commentary on the contemporary state of affairs and present some modest, yet substantial and liable predictions into the discourse of politics, security, and international relations.

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Abstrakt

Táto práca predstavuje multidisciplinárnu analýzu fenoménu vojny. Spočiatku sa pokúša na daný predmet nazerať prostredníctvom práce Carla von Clausewitza ktorého dômyselné idey a preniknutie do podstaty fenoménu vojny, prezentované v jeho diele *On War*, predstavujú ako celok významnú paradigmatu moderného spôsobu vedenia vojny, ako aj nášho súčasného chápania *umenia* vojny samotného.

Táto práca si za svoj hlavný cieľ stanovuje overiť platnosť a relevantnosť Clausewitzovej paradigmaty v súčasnom svete, v kontexte meniaceho sa charakteru vojny a ozbrojeného konfliktu. Konkrétne v kontexte globálneho posunu od *moderného* ku *postmodernému* konfliktu, pre ktorý sú charakteristické podmienky *hypermoderného* spôsobu vedenia vojny ovplyvneného pokrokom vo vede a technológiách, predovšetkým však vynálezom nukleárných zbraní, ktoré so sebou priniesli možnosť absolútneho nukleárneho holokaustu. Posun od *moderného* k *postmodernému* konfliktu je tiež charakterizovaný podmienkami, ktoré vznikajú akoby v opozícii k modernému spôsobu vedenia vojny. To ma za následok, že počet *vnútroštátnych* konfliktov s nízkou intenzitou asymetrického spôsobu boja rastie, zatiaľ čo počet *medzištátnych* konfliktov s vysokou intenzitou, prebiehajúcich medzi riadnymi, regulárnymi ozbrojenými jednotkami, klesá.

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Druhým cieľom práce je preskúmať spôsob, akým vojna a jej chápanie ovplyvňuje ustanovenie súčasného svetového poriadku a svetového poriadku vo všeobecnosti. Na základe celkovej syntézy teoretických, historických, sociologických, ako aj filozofických a metafyzických aspektov súvisiacich s fenoménom vojny sa táto práca pokúša poskytnúť kritický komentár súčasnej situácie a prispieť tak do diskusie o politike, bezpečnosti a medzinárodných vzťahov niekoľkými, síce skromnými, no podstatnými názormi a prognózami.

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My gratitude also belongs to my parents and family, who have provided me with love and support throughout my studies. In doing so, they played a crucial part in the formation of this project.

Writing of this thesis has been a wonderful and enriching experience for me. In the process of producing it, I have come across a variety of new concepts and information regarding the phenomenon of war and the realm of international relations. I can honestly say this journey has presented me with new experience that I am looking forward to utilize in my future academic, as well as professional career.

As regards to potential omissions and mistakes, these are a result of either the limited scope of the thesis, or that of my own. For these, the responsibility is solely mine.

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Introduction

American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once said: ‘God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference’. I firmly contend that Niebuhr’s quotation neatly encapsulates the origins of every human dilemma, though I am not sure if God needs be present in the equation. Every person struggles to attain acquiescence through the use of reason. However, like all valuable things in life, true wisdom is not a given. It is not granted; it has to be acquired.

A perception seems to prevail among people, especially in the western part of the world, that we have somehow arrived at an age, when human endeavour can successfully and permanently eradicate some, if not all of the, regrettable aspects of human condition—such as war, poverty, disease, hunger, or even ‘evil’ in general—that have accompanied humanity throughout its journey through history.

While some aspects that have been perceived as an inseparable part of human existence and our struggle for survival have been successfully mediated by the means of scientific progress, engineering, careful planning and, above all, exercise of human intellect and ingenuity, others seem to prevail in a completely unaltered fashion.

These idealist conceptions and perceptions of the world we live in are of honourable nature, no doubt – creating a peaceful world would certainly be desirable. However, there is no easy way to escape the harsh world of hostile conditions, security competition, and war.

There is nothing wrong with being a dreamer, except, in the realm of international politics, the stakes are simply too high. History in general, and events like the Munich Agreement (‘Betrayal’) of 1938 in particular, teaches us that there is a small step from showing good faith, while underestimating the overall situation as well as security implication, and a violent conflict threatening to obliterate the world as we know it. This is why people should always hope for the best and prepare for the worst. This is true both on a personal level as well as on the international one. The difference is, however, that on the level of international relations political elites are entrusted with the responsibility over, and have to make decisions on behalf of, the well being of their citizens and subjects. The responsibility is enormous for it contains the burden of making decisions that could significantly affect the course of existence of the state and its people.

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International relations, being such an important and serious enterprise, should act strictly upon, and according to, principles that correspond with reality and the world we live in. This means that the policy and the way we approach violent conflict and its resolution should reflect the unique socio-economic conditions and realities of the prevailing state of affairs instead of implementing policies that are based on mere wishful thinking. One should also be careful not to end up prescribing historical solutions that are ‘historical’ in the negative sense of the world—meaning prescribing solutions that are out-dated, obsolete, or simply unfit for solving a particular problem in a particular time and place with its unique particular conditions.

This does not mean, however, that all things coming from the past should be disregarded as ‘historical’. In *The Life of Reason*, George Santayana came to the bottom of things by emphasizing that when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. The message of the necessity of repetition becoming *cumulative*, conscious process is encapsulated in his famous aphorism: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’ (1998, p. 82). History has a lot to teach us.

Nevertheless, the conditions are always changing with an ever-increasing pace. Nowadays, new generations come to experience a world significantly different from the one experienced by their parents and forefathers. The wording of the above aphorism is somewhat unfortunate, for one may ‘remember’ yet still ‘repeat’ and do all of the mistakes of history over and over again. Based on my reading of the text, I am aware of Santayana’s above-mentioned emphasis on the remembering ceasing to be purely repetitive and becoming a cumulative, conscious process of *learning* (learning might have been a more suitable word choice in the first place). It is not sufficient to remember things; we also have to learn from them as well.

This is why history may indeed present a valid prescription for policies and actions in any particular era regardless of its technological advancement. For, to borrow from Mark Twain, the history may not repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes.

It is important to keep this understanding of history in mind at all times, for—apart from discussing the phenomenon of war in general, along with its impact on the constitution of the international order—the main objective of this thesis is to prove the relevance of Carl von Clausewitz—his teaching and legacy—in the modern world.

This work will present a multidisciplinary, critical analysis of the phenomenon of war. First of all, it attempts to look at the issue through the work of Carl von Clausewitz, whose

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profound insights into the subject matter articulated in *On War* presents a major paradigm in *modern* warfare and our contemporary understanding of the *art* of war. Furthermore, the work sets to test the validity, relevance of the Clausewitz paradigm in the contemporary world in light of the changing character of war—from *modern* to what could be labelled *post-modern*—namely the conditions of *hypermodern* war—influenced by the progress in science and technology, especially the invention of the nuclear bomb introducing the possibility of a nuclear holocaust—as well as *anti-modern* war—marked by the rise of the *intra-state*, low intensity conflict and irregular warfare rather than *inter-state* conflicts between regular forces. Second of all, through the works of Michael Howard, Carl Schmitt and Julius Evola, this work aims to explore the way in which war, and understanding thereof, influences the constitution of our contemporary world order, as well as the world order in general. Based on the overall understanding of the theoretical, historical, sociological as well as philosophical and metaphysical understanding of the phenomenon of war this work attempts to present a critical commentary on the contemporary state of affairs and present some modest, yet liable predictions into the discourse of politics, security, and international relations.

CHAPTER 1: War

1.1 Why War?

It appears that violence, armed conflict, and war between various organized political groups, has been the universal norm in human history rather than an exception.

I hold that war constitutes a fundamental part of the human condition; or rather, it represents an unavoidable, extreme manifestation of our political nature that reflects our ever-changing social and material conditions. Throughout history, war has been an important factor causing major changes in the constitutions of the world order. Whether we like it or not, violence plays an important part in social and political relations, and war—or rather one's understanding thereof—determines the way it is used and abused by political elites. Refusing to think about unpleasant phenomena does not help us appreciate their magnitude, nor does it help us eradicate them. Although war is certainly unpleasant and very much regrettable, our unwillingness to recognise its relevance prior to its outbreak can only hinder our struggle with it. The same principle has historically applied to our unwillingness to recognise the imminence of terror and genocide.

Humankind can only deal effectively with formidable problems by applying the intellect, and one's effective application of the intellect requires disengagement from sentiment, passion, and fear.

As Carl Schmitt says in *The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War (1937)*, the history of international law is a history of the concept of war (Schmitt, 2011, p. 31). This suggests that, in order to understand how a given international system works, one must first examine *how* war is defined; and second, study *who* decides which phenomena are labelled 'wars of aggression', and which are labelled 'interventions' or 'counter-insurgency operations'. As we know, history is written by the victors, or as Schmitt would say, '*Caesar dominus et supra grammaticam*' [the emperor is also the master of grammar]. We shall examine this phenomenon in due course.

1.2 War & Peace

When attempting to talk about war, one must necessarily discuss the issue in relation to its counter part – peace. Throughout the history of mankind, the discourse has always been

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divided between those who hold that peace is a natural state (condition) that must be preserved, and those who hold that it is a privilege that must be attained. We experience peace either in its *negative* form, simply as an absence of war, or better to say a period when war is neither imminent nor actually being fought; and in its *positive* form, as a product of a political and social ordering of the society that provides stability and is generally considered to be just. Clausewitz saw war as a perfectly natural phenomenon that occurs when there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the prevailing state of affairs. After the ‘reshuffle’, peace is established. His position is based on *rational* calculation, perhaps comparable to the one of Geoffrey Blainey—who maintains that peace is fostered when one or both sides feel they have more to lose by fighting than by making compromises (Blainey, 1988). This understanding of war and peace—with its seeming overemphasis on rationality—seems to be overlooking the basic factors that Thucydides described as three general causes of war—*fear*, *honour*, and *interest* (Thucydides, 2009)—but we shall return to this point later on.

1.3 Humanity & Society

Humanity as such designates either a biological category in terms of a species or a philosophical one stemming from the tradition of Western thought. However, ‘from the socio-historical viewpoint, man as such does not exist, because his membership within humanity is always mediated by a particular cultural belonging’ (Benoist & Champetier, 2012, p. 25). We all share the same human nature and thus the essential human aspirations. Without these shared aspirations we would be unable to understand each other. Nevertheless, these tend to crystallise in different forms according to different time and place. Which is why, in this sense, humanity is essentially plural and diversity is part of its very essence. Out of this diversity both conflict as well as cooperation may occur.

Throughout history, cooperation has presented the engine behind human endeavour and progress. Without human cooperation, no achievement of historical proportion and significance would be possible for only by cooperating are people able to attain the specialisation, division of labour and efficiency necessary to produce more ‘energy’ than they are able to consume. However, given the diversity inherent to humanity, it often occurs that people perceive that they possess goals that are incompatible with the ones of other people. This is when conflict occurs.

1.4 Security & Stability

State, in our modern understanding, presents a politically organised people in an enclosed territorial unit that in a decisive case presents the ultimate authority. In another words, ‘a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 2004, p. 33). This is fine on the domestic level, where conflicts among citizens are settled by the tribunals and institutions representing the authority of the state. Nevertheless, on the level of international politics, when it comes to disputes among states, there is no monopoly and each nation reserves the right to use force (Raymond, 2009, p. 595). International system is ruled by anarchy—a fundamental position shared by the American school of realism, namely Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau as well as Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 2001), John J. Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2001) and even Raymond Aron. According to Gabriel Michele Dufour, the basic purpose and the fundamental act of government ‘aims at defending society itself or as embodied in the government against its internal or external enemies, overt or covert, present or future...’ (Dufour, 1868, p. 128).

Joseph Nye has stated rather aptly that ‘to ignore the role of force and the centrality of security would be like ignoring oxygen. Under normal circumstances, oxygen is plentiful and we pay it little attention. But once those conditions change and we begin to miss it, we can focus on nothing else’ (Nye, 2002, p. 7). In other words, men may not be interested in war, but war has always been interested in men. The peremptory tone of this aphorism, often attributed to Leon Trotsky, only attests to the all-encompassing nature of war.

1.5 Heirs of the Enlightenment

As Sir Norman Angel did before the outbreak of the First World War (Angel, 1911), many people still dismiss war as something barbaric, something belonging to the past. They would claim that we now have the means and the capacity to eradicate it, to do away with war (Mueller, 2010). Many people in the West believe that ‘perpetual peace’ is finally at hand.

It is true that many philosophers throughout history described people as rational beings; nevertheless, history itself would more often than not disagree. One may not like it, but given the nature of our existence—guided not only by rational calculation, but also by powerful emotions and chance—conflict and war does not seem to be leaving, at least not any foreseeable future. Which is why, in the meantime, it might be useful to try to understand the phenomenon within the changing context of international relations and attempt to identify the

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way in which this complex and controversial phenomenon shapes the constitution and perception of our contemporary world order.

It is true that human progress, in general, led also to the expansion of diplomatic relations and other actors operating on the boundary between peace and war; nevertheless it changes nothing about the fact that everything is subject to the supreme law – the decision by arms. For when diplomacy fails, war steps in, as an ultimate and fundamental way ('argument') of continuing the political commerce – a carrying out of the same by other means.

The prevailing nature of the phenomenon of war was aptly summarized by Carl von Clausewitz, when he remarked that if

civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them more effective ways of using force than the crude expression of instinct. The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 115).

Many modern-day idealists, liberals, but also some (defensive) realists (Waltz, 2001) do not recognize that there might be important benefits to be gained from war, and argue that wars are largely the result of uncertainty and miscalculation. However, Clausewitz has quite a different understanding of war. And so do various traditional societies and cultures briefly discussed in the last chapter.

Clausewitz himself does neither condemn, nor does he approve of war, but rather takes it as a given fact – a natural phenomenon. Nevertheless, he emphasizes the fact that 'it would be futile—even wrong—to try and shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality' (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 101). It would not bring any good to anybody. Once again, refusing to think about unpleasant things does not help to eradicate them.

Although this may not sound ideal, this is how things are. The message of Clausewitz is for the states to behave according to the dictates of realist logic (and thus for governments to fulfil their fundamental purpose outlined by Dufour) if they want to prevail. For it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.

1.6 Why Clausewitz?

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian soldier and writer. His fame rests on *On War (Vom Kriege)*, which was published posthumously by his wife in 1832.

On War is a wide reaching treatise on the art of warfare in which Carl von Clausewitz presents war as a coherent system of political thought. It is a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects, in which he came up with insights, descriptions, and definitions that has won wide acceptance and had a large influence on the ‘Western thought’.

Given his ‘German’ background, his vast amount of influence in military circles and some of the implications derived from the misinterpreted understandings of people, who only manage to scratch the surface of his teaching, Clausewitz presents a very controversial thinker. Since relatively few people read Clausewitz and his original work themselves, when combined with the prevalent and popular trend in contemporary era of modernity to disregard everything coming from the past as ‘historical’ and therefore obsolete, Clausewitz and his teaching gets often misunderstood, misinterpreted, or dismissed as out-dated. Nevertheless, Clausewitz gets regularly resurrected, as ever-new generations of thinkers seem to stumble across the seemingly same problems that had troubled human societies throughout history. In turbulent times, especially when our modern, ‘omniscient’ society fails to deliver satisfactory solutions, people tend to turn to the classics for fundamental insights and look for the ones, which are relevant to their own era and could present solutions for their present situation.

The reason why Clausewitz and his treatise attract major interest—the fact that is often misunderstood by his critics—is that he does not attempt to sell a program or prescribe solutions. ‘The function of criticism would be missed entirely if criticism were to degenerate into a mechanical application of theory... A critic should never use the results of theory as laws and standards, but only—as the soldier does—as aids to judgment’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 250). He does not attempt to come up with a general theory of war that should have been, and could have been, applicable in every case and under every circumstance (at all costs). *On War* attempts to provide the material and enable the reader to establish a mind-set of one’s own, based on which one should be better equipped to consider individual, particular circumstances that are in themselves always unique. This is the reason why the core teaching, or message, of Clausewitz survives the test of history, and does not—and cannot—become out-dated in any given historical epoch (regardless of its technological advancement).

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Each generation of people reads Clausewitz in the light of their own specific and unique experience reflecting the particular circumstances they live in, while having certain hindsight on history, and therefore their own understanding of war. Nevertheless, if anything, this constant resurgence of Clausewitz and his ideas only speaks in favour of his remarkable insight into the issue of human nature and existence accompanied by war. It also speaks in favour of the possibility for the ever-new generations of scholars coming up with fresh, new insights based on the reading of *On War*, and thus improving our present condition.

CHAPTER 2: The Legacy of Carl von Clausewitz

2.1 The Purpose of Theory

The purpose, or benefit of having a theory, according to Clausewitz, is

that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. [The theory] is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 213).

As discussed earlier, theory should not be expected to provide solutions and instant war plans—‘one should never use elaborate scientific guidelines as if they were a kind of truth machine’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 264)—it rather serves the purpose of educating the judgment of an individual.

Theory attempts to introduce a kind of an order into chaos and help the commander order his ideas. But Clausewitz is well aware of the limited help any theory could provide due to the vast uncertainties and diverse possibilities.

2.2 Definitions

In the previous chapter, we have mentioned some *general*, yet crucial, terms, concepts, and definitions in order to establish sort of an agreement, or common ground with readers of this treatise. Discussing these issues also meant to provide readers with a glimpse of the bigger picture, in which the author of this thesis sees Clausewitz. Even though his work does not discuss politics directly, it continues to influence peoples’ understanding of the phenomenon of war, thus having a direct impact on the things political. Which is why one should view Clausewitz not as a *mere* philosopher of war—as he is often described—but foremost as a *political* philosopher. We shall now turn to the concepts and definitions that present the very core of this work.

It is always useful to first define the terms that are to be used in a discourse in order to be able to form a mutual understanding of the key terminology and issues that would form the foundation of the discussion, provide clarity and understanding as opposed to discrepancy and

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obscurity. It is true that categorical distinctions and groupings help us cope with the diversity and complexity of the issues we are dealing with, nevertheless categorisations often hide a great deal more than they reveal.

For example, our contemporary society obsessed with science, technology and, above all, measurement determines the difference between violent conflict and war by the casualty threshold, which means that ‘as soon as the number of annual battle-related deaths reaches the threshold of a 1000 the conflict is defined as “war”’ (Demmers, 2012, p. 3). This definition, however, does not tell you anything about the complex nature of war. It does not attempt to bring you any closer to the understanding of the phenomenon, it merely categorizes. If it tells you anything, it is that an instrumentalist attitude prevails in contemporary society in which the complexity of a human life can be reduced to a single number, and the value of that number is determined by the cost/benefit analysis. It is but a desperate attempt to measure violent conflict along with all the ‘amount’ of human suffering, acts of both cowardice and bravery, as well as struggle for survival that accompany it. All these are attempts to measure what is immeasurable. Which is why, in order to understand the nature and complexity of war, one must necessarily turn to metaphysics.

2.3 What is War?

‘War’, according to Clausewitz, is ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 100). It is therefore of dual nature for it comprises both moral and physical force. It is a relation between human wills whose specific character (nature) is the resort to physical violence—a discharge of strength.

It is an organised form of violence that states, or politically organised groups, use against other states or groups of people in order to either gain an advantage, or attain a certain goal. ‘War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 240).

On the level of individuals, this conflict manifests as a fight, or rather a duel, or a wrestling match. However, as soon as we substitute arms for bodies and community for individuals, the whole conflict gains a whole different dimension and turns into a conflict of much greater proportion.

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Nevertheless, the conflict remains ‘nothing but a duel on a larger scale’. Men fight each other, and states wage wars against each other, armed with weapons and other products of civilisation—‘Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the inventions of art and science’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 100).

2.4 War and Politics

Accompanying the previous definition is the notorious dictum that war is a mere continuation of policy by other means, or to be precise, it is ‘a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p.157).

Many people, who are unfamiliar with Clausewitz’s actual purpose and meaning, are repulsed by this famous definition. In fact the definition is often taken out of context and slandered by some of the Clausewitz’s critics, who are of course correct when pointing out the ethical as well as practical implications of war being ‘just another routine tool for politicians’. Though *On War* is not much concerned with examining the causes of war or the sources of conflict in general, and sets to explore the phenomenon of war as such, it certainly appears to be the case that Clausewitz accepts the existence of political violence as an inseparable part of human condition and considers its manifestations to be inevitable. He sees war as an instrument, nevertheless he is very much aware of, and very much explicit about its risky and uncertain nature.

Even though he claims that war is a continuation of politics, a phenomenon that cannot be divorced from political life (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 1017), he is very careful to distinguish between war and politics, putting a strong emphasis on war’s subordinate position to the political interest. He argues that war could only be justified when debate was no longer adequate, and that if undertaken—based on the cost/benefit analysis—its aim should ultimately be to attain a political interest and thus improve the well being of a nation.

War, for Clausewitz, is always a ‘serious means for a serious end’ (Clausewitz, 1989, pp. 155,156). The political object remains the aim, while war remains the means that could never be considered in a way divorced from the aim. One should therefore, according to Clausewitz, never think of war in itself, but always in relation to peace that constitutes the ultimate objective of politics, and, therefore, of war. ‘The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 138).

In the end, as Clausewitz said, even ‘the aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); [for] he would prefer to take over our country unopposed’ (1989, p. 138).

2.5 Friction

Difficulty of seeing things correctly is one of the greatest sources of friction in war. It occurs every time our intention, or plan attempts to manifest itself by the means of action and comes into contact with chance. In another words, incidents take place upon which it was impossible to calculate, for their chief origins are determined by chance.

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war... Countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 169).

Friction thus encapsulates everything one could think of—and everything else—that has the potential to influence the course of our actions in a way that is not intended or desirable. It, therefore, bears responsibility for the reality and real events not matching our ideals and plans. Clausewitz likens the action in war to a movement in a resistant element (p. 170) proclaiming friction to be ‘the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult’ (p. 171) and ‘the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper’ (p. 169).

The military machine—the army and everything related to it—is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction (Clausewitz, 1989, pp. 169, 170).

2.6 Information & The Fog of War

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 167).

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The problem of information and uncertainty of all data is one of the greatest problems of war, for, to a certain extent, every action in war has to be planned, and all action takes place

in a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are. Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeble light has to be guessed at by talent, or simply left to chance. So once again for lack of objective knowledge one has to trust to talent or to luck (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 209).

Lower ranks can be guided by theory and prescription, however ‘the higher the rank, the more the problems multiply, reaching their highest point in the supreme commander. At this level, almost all solutions must be left to imaginative intellect’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 212).

As we can imagine, the variability of external factors causing friction—including the lack of information—is infinite, which is why Clausewitz emphasized the inherent unpredictability of war. This is why Clausewitz theory is heavily reliant on the concept of *genius*.

2.7 The Concept of Genius

He maintains, that ‘any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called a “genius”’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 145).

Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 210).

In order to compensate for the shortcomings of theory, or rather to illuminate the realm outside its scope, Clausewitz introduces the French term, *coup d’oeil*. It corresponds to the words ‘glimpse’ or ‘glance’, but rather than concerning the actual capacity to see and faculty of sight, it has much more to do with the ‘inner eye’. *Coup d’oeil* serves as a concept to explain the capacity of the great commander to analyse properly any particular situation and come up with optimal solutions by himself. One could argue that this particular trait has to do,

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to a large degree, with innate characteristics and predispositions, rather than Clausewitz's teaching. Possessing or not possessing this quality would be, therefore, just a result of chance. This is an important observation. In fact a kind of a belief in natural aristocracy is observable and very much prevalent in Clausewitz's writing.

In accordance with the concept of natural aristocracy, he introduces the concept of *genius* in general, and *military genius* in particular, in order to compensate for the shortcomings of theory in general and theory of war respectively. He defines and understands the concept of genius in general, quite loosely, simply as 'a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation' (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 145).

He maintains that 'appropriate talent is needed at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed. But history and posterity reserve the name of "genius" for those who have excelled in the highest positions—as commanders-in-chief—since here the demands for intellectual and moral powers are vastly greater' (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 160).

According to Clausewitz, 'war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth' (p. 147). The theory should be a study, not a doctrine. The purpose of the theory of war is to provide a mind-set, a scaffolding to support and organize thoughts and experience, which in combination with the capacity of *coup d'oeil* enables one to 'see' through the fog of war and thus makes for a good commander.

As the late five-star general of the United States Army—who during the Second World War served as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, and later on became the 34th President of the United States—Dwight D. Eisenhower once said: 'In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.'

CHAPTER 3: Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century

3.1 The Magnificent Trinity

In the beginning of the previous chapter we have discussed Clausewitz's definitions of war. The first one characterised the phenomenon as nothing but a duel or a wrestling match on an extensive scale, while the other defines it as a mere continuation of the political commerce—policy—by additional means. It is an act of force intended to compel one's enemy to fulfil one's will. This could lead one to think that Clausewitz considered war to be a perfectly legitimate enterprise, justifying strong, aggressive, bloodthirsty, militaristic despots who want to expand their wealth and interests and dominate the weak. This would also mean—due to his more than active role in the military establishment—that Clausewitz was part of the same 'club', or even worse, unable to 'join' it for his lack of a noble status, he was 'serving' its interests.

However, while actually reading the treatise—especially the first book of the first chapter—and recognizing its dialectical nature, it becomes quite obvious that Clausewitz's sentences and definitions are not supposed to be read separately, but rather in the context of the whole chapter, and thus in relation to one another. Together, Clausewitz's dual definition of war suggests, that it is neither *nothing but* an act of brute force nor *merely* a rational act of politics or policy. The synthesis of the two aspects lies in Clausewitz's concept of the magnificent (wondrous) *trinity*: a dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, rational calculation, and the play of chance.

As Clausewitz put it:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in

the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets [or points of attraction] (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 131).

As we can imagine, the variability among the trinity's factors is infinite, which is why Clausewitz emphasized the inherent unpredictability of war. As Christopher Bassford puts it in his article titled *The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought*, published in the *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, 'political events [in fact all the events happening in our lives, including war for that matter] and their outcomes are the product of conflicting, contradictory, sometimes cooperating or compromising, but often antagonistic forces, always modulated by chance. Outcomes are seldom if ever precisely what any individual participant desired or intended. Thus politics cannot be described as a "rational" process' (Bassford, 2007, p. 85). This also has to do with the limitations calculation and prescriptive theories when these are confronted with immediate complexities of real life, especially when on the battlefield. Once again, this is why Clausewitz theory relies heavily on the concept of *genius*.

3.2 Hypermodern War: Technological Advancement and Nuclear Armaments

Military thinking, as well as the diplomatic realm, between 1945 and the end of the Cold War was dominated by the introduction of nuclear armaments and considerations of the possibility of their deployment—'taking' war and strategic decisions from the army and placing it in the hands of the political leadership – the red button. Nuclear arms also presented something completely new and unprecedented. This meant that civilian thinkers, intellectuals and strategist such as Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn could challenge the monopoly of strategic decision making held by the military, for, after all they themselves had practically the same experience when it came to actual nuclear warfare – zero (Schelling, 1990; Kahn, 1985; Kahn, 2007). There were some who thus claimed that, due to the destructive potential of nuclear arms and the fact that a nuclear confrontation would quite possibly result in a nuclear holocaust and perhaps even a destruction of life on earth, Clausewitz lost his relevance to modern conflict for, under such circumstances, nuclear war could never serve as

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an instrument of policy. On the other hand, there were also some who argued that his importance had in fact increased for the importance of understanding the relations between war and policy was now greater than ever (Smith, 2004, p. 244). The introduction of new means of waging war does not mean that Clausewitz loses his relevance—war as a chameleon. If anything, keeping in mind the possibility of the nuclear holocaust only encourages political elites to exercise prudence in international relations, especially when contemplating war in order to attain their political ends.

Considering the destructive potential of nuclear arms and the short period of time necessary for the deployment and delivery of a nuclear ballistic missile, all preparations for the possible exchange had to be done in advance. They also had to lead to totality—the possibility of error had to be additionally ‘insured’ and compensated for by the means of increasing the number of missiles etc., eventually reaching a level of a manifold mutual overkill—for if the bricks actually started to fall, no omission could have been rectified. This is why nuclear war seemed to have destroyed all the modifying principles in real war.

This is why some nuclear strategists started using the term ‘nuclear exchange’, rather than ‘war’, for, first of all, wars have ends—which is peace—and the result of a nuclear exchange would be death and obliteration; and second of all, resulting in nothing but death and obliteration it truly seems not to be serving a purpose of a rational policy of any kind. This, however, is not an argument against Clausewitz’s theory of war, for, if anything, it merely proves that nuclear exchange fails to meet Clausewitz’s definition of war. Luckily, nuclear ‘war’ did not occur and as far as ‘weapons could be tested in the real world but strategies for their employment could not nuclear war remained war on paper’ (Smith, 2004, p. 245).

As a result of entire populations of people being held hostage by the sword of Damocles hanging above their heads, some people argued that instead of winning wars, the purpose of the military establishment must now be to avert them, otherwise the whole military machine presents a direct, deadly threat to the very people and establishment it is supposed to protect.

In order to counter the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, the world superpowers in possession of nuclear arms came up with various devices, threats, strategies and complex mechanisms designed to create (more than) a sufficient deterrent to prevent their adversaries—as well as the hard-line members of their own military and political establishment—from taking harsh decisions. One of such deterrence tactics was the doctrine of massive retaliation that the United States of America came up with early on into the Cold War in order to counter the

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Soviet supremacy of regular, conventional armed forces. The doctrine threatened to retaliate with nuclear force to any act of aggression or military threat to US interest. However, various infringements took place and nothing happened. The doctrine was abandoned altogether when the US ceased to have the monopoly on the atomic bomb and massive retaliation for minor infringements no longer seemed as a good idea due to the possible nuclear retaliation by the Soviets.

Another mechanism designed to prevent the use of nuclear arms and diminishing the possibility of nuclear confrontation that could escalate and result in a nuclear holocaust was the doctrine of a mutual assured destruction usually referred to as 'MAD'. The idea behind MAD is that the relationship between two nuclear rivals could be stable as long as they are both capable of destroying, as well as being destroyed by, the other. The doctrine of MAD is conditioned by the possession of a secure second-strike possibility enabling both parties to retaliate massively even after receiving the first strike. Securing the second-strike possibility relies on various factors including both the actual numbers of nuclear missiles, and, more importantly, the strategic deployment and distribution of nuclear arms, technology, early warning system capable of intercepting them etc. The idea is that the relationship could be made stable with relatively small number of arms that could lead to their overall decrease. Nevertheless the doctrine merely pushed the arms race in a different direction—the one of innovation and 'quality' over 'quantity'. The stability of the relationship was constantly threatened as the innovation in the technology of 'delivery' developed disproportionately to the ones of 'interception' and vice versa, one time favouring the 'defender', another the 'attacker'. However, the consensus seems to be that overall, due to financial costs and engineering complexity, the advantage seems to have been most of the time on the side of the 'defender', rising the cost of a potential nuclear war beyond all reason. Luckily, the influence of reason on political decision-making, so much stressed by Clausewitz, seem to have prevailed (Although the inability of the USSR to compete with the US economically and to sustain the arms race played a major role).

This, however, does not mean that the period of Cold War was peaceful. The doctrine of a mutually assured destruction and the threat of a nuclear holocaust prevented the two superpowers from nuclear confrontation, nevertheless this does not mean they did not actively look for—and have not found—less direct ways of both promoting and defending their political interests. With a tacit consensus that a nuclear war would not serve anyone's interest, the two adversaries held to the good old traditional means of conflict resolution by the means of diplomacy and the decision by regular arms. Thus the war, along with the strategic

decisions seemed to have ‘returned’ into the hands of the military, though it had never stepped outside the realm of Clausewitz’s trinity.

3.3 Continuing Relevance of the Conventional Forces

As we know, apart from minor confrontations, the majority of armed confrontations between the two camps during the period took the form of proxy wars, without one side directly confronting the other. When North Korea invaded the South, the United States sent in troops to counter the communist threat backed by the Soviets and Chinese. In Vietnam, the two adversaries both supported different warring parties in the conflict eventually resulting in America’s direct involvement and deployment of troops. And when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, the US eagerly supported the Mujahideen, who ferociously fought the invader... Just to mention a few out of many examples.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the threat of the nuclear war seemed to have vaporized. The forces of the Western liberal democracy seemed to have triumphed. However, freedom does not necessarily establish peace. Capitalism and rule of the market can also ‘work’ only in communities with already existing stable civil societies with efficient bureaucracy and common moral values, which are all conditions unable to rise instantly from a sudden change. Violent conflict and armed confrontations flourished in some parts of the world that now lacked the ironhanded presence of the ‘red leviathan’. The power vacuum—not only in the post-communist countries but also in the weak, or failed states around the world—was in many countries filled with the formation, revival, or increased power and popularity of various groups building their identity on ethnic, national, or religious consciousness. This only attested to an increasing trend, or rather a shift from symmetric, inter-state to asymmetric, intra-state wars.

As Hugh Smith remarks: ‘Where modern war sought to isolate fighting on a battlefield, hypermodern war made entire societies into targets, abolishing traditional distinctions between soldier and civilian, and between front and rear’ (Smith, 2004, p. 245). The conception of civilian populations as legitimate targets due to their partaking in the war effort—resulting in naval blockades, carpet-bombings of the cities of Europe and fire-bombing of Japan during the Second World War—prevails in the contemporary globalized world, constituting the very core of asymmetric warfare, as well as of the idea behind the phenomenon of terrorism.

3.4 Anti-modern War: Rise of the Asymmetric Conflict and the Importance of Non-state Actors

Many scholars, most notably Martin van Creveld in his *On Future Wars* predicted that future wars would increasingly take form of a low-intensity conflict fought within the states rather than between them (Creveld, 1991). This prediction indeed seems to be the prevailing and ever-increasing trend since the end of the Second World War and more importantly during the Cold War and after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Datasets such as the UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) ‘show a global shift from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict in the post WWII era, with big peak in the early 1990s when over 50 of these conflicts were recorded.’ In addition, ‘of the 118 conflicts that have taken place between 1989 and 2004, only seven have been inter-state wars.’ And as for the period between ‘2004-9, all 36 registered armed conflicts were fought within states, with the exception of the inter-state conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2008’ (Demmers, 2012, p. 3).

Many authors have stressed the interest that revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao Zedong took in Clausewitz and how his discussion of guerrilla tactics contributed to their theory of revolutionary war. Some authors emphasized the interests that armies have taken in Clausewitz, precisely after their traditional forces have failed against the irregular separatist forces, partisans and guerrillas, such as, for example, the British in the South African War of 1899-1902 (Smith, 2004, p. 238). Nevertheless, based on the above-mentioned trend prevailing in the area of violent conflict—or rather shift from inter-state to intra-state, low-intensity conflict—still more people have claimed that Clausewitz’s theory of war would no longer be applicable to modern conflict. This prediction, however, stems mainly from the flawed interpretation of Clausewitz’s trinity as the *people*, the *army* and the *government*. It is true, as we have seen above, that Clausewitz indeed mentions these categories. Nevertheless, the original conception of the trinity was (and is) to help to accommodate the diverse and indomitable forces of *reason*, *passion* and *chance* that together exercise crucial influence over the planning, actual exercise, as well as the aftermath of war.

The linking of the three forces to the components of the state are included merely to illustrate the point (‘The first of these three aspects *mainly* concerns...’). Clausewitz is quite explicit about the trinity when he says that it is composed of ‘primordial *violence*, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force [sometimes summarised as *passion*]; of the *play of chance* and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its

element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to *reason*' (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 131) (emphasis added).

Viewed from this perspective, I believe it is quite obvious that there really cannot be such a thing as a 'non-trinitarian' warfare. Nevertheless, to demonstrate this point, that is, to discuss the prevalence of the trinity in contemporary conflict, we shall look more closely to the issue of non-state actors, terrorism and the phenomenon of suicide bombing, which present the extreme manifestation of asymmetric warfare, in which, by the means of employing the strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the belligerents attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses.

3.5 Politics and Rationale behind Terrorism and Suicide Bombing

Terrorism in general, as well as the phenomenon of suicide bombing and self-martyrdom operations in particular are phenomena that have significantly baffled conflict and terrorism researchers, stirred numerous debates and caused controversy and outrage among politicians and members of the general public. On the one hand, based on the prevalence of the Rational Choice Theory in contemporary social sciences, I would argue that the majority of researchers hold that terrorists, even suicide terrorists, are perfectly rational actors. In his paper *Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach*, Luis de la Corte attempts to question the rationality of terrorists and the Rational Choice Theory in general, though I believe he confuses *rationality* when he bases his judgment on regarding rationality of a certain action or strategy on the actual outcome and its *efficiency*. He questions the rationality of terrorists because they are unable to 'anticipate perfectly or realize *a posteriori* the complete sum of consequences that could be produced by their own actions' (De la Corte, 2007). But if we were to establish the threshold this high the term 'rationality' would become redundant for virtually nobody would qualify as 'rational'. Then there are politicians and ruling elites, who tend to claim the exact opposite as the majority of researchers and often like to dismiss acts of terrorism as cowardly acts of savage psychopaths and religious zealots coming from poor backgrounds and desperate living conditions that simply envy 'our way of life'.

It is important to question such dismissive claims, especially the ones that tend to depoliticize terrorism, for their primary objective is to direct its recipient away of the roots and thus the information necessary for understanding the phenomenon, as well as conditions and various factors that are causing it. Without a critical approach to such claims, we are unable to understand the phenomenon, prevent the phenomenon, and are incapable of coming up with

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effective solutions to the problems behind the complex issue of terrorism and the phenomenon of suicide bombing.

Nevertheless, it is also important to try to understand why the above-mentioned assumptions about self-martyrdom operations are appealing to general public and tend to prevail and dominate in the discourse regarding the issue.

In the cultural context and conditions that I am going to label ‘Western’ or ‘post-modern’ perception that rests on individualism, de-sacralisation, rationalisation, respect for human life, and placement of a strong, existential emphasis on a life of a single individual; right for self-determination etc., the majority of people is confused, outraged and have no understanding whatsoever for an individual who willingly and readily sets to destroy property, kill ‘innocent’ people, and even sacrifice his or her own life in the process. I shall argue that the people in Europe, for example, are as outraged by the incidents of the high-school shootings in the U.S as with the suicide bombings taking place in the Middle East. The problem is, however, that people tend to put both kinds of actions into the same box labelled as acts of deviant, unstable, psychologically flawed, crazy individuals. Even though the classification might *perhaps* more often than not apply to public shootings, it is definitely more complicated when it comes to the acts of terrorism.

One of the most significant common denominators of terrorist acts is that—like war according to Clausewitz—terrorism as a strategy is politically motivated and designed to attain a certain political goal – end. And acts of political calculations and deliberation are the ones constrained almost exclusively to the realm of rational thinking conducted by rational actors. Therefore, regardless of the particular actor’s motivation for sacrificing their life for a cause, suicide bombing as such is a rational strategy of implementing different, if unorthodox means—condemned by the majority of population—in order to attain a certain political goal. Thus, considering the violent nature of terrorism—as opposed to a peaceful participation in the political process—to implement a strategy of suicide bombing in certain conditions and under certain circumstances may make a perfect sense to certain actors. For example if they possess a will but lack the necessary means to challenge the materially superior forces of the establishment or enemy group. Many people who have a ‘western’ background are unable to contemplate the possibility of self-sacrifice in terms of martyrdom (we shall elaborate on this issue in the next chapter). However, many authors emphasize that the notions of martyrdom and self-sacrifice are readily available in many cultures and are only needed to be decoupled from the stigma of suicide (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smith, 2011, p. 217).

When it comes to war as such, the majority of people in the contemporary society think about it as something terrible (and perhaps wrong). Nevertheless, the same people are also often able to come up with a variety of legitimate causes for war and recognize a certain rationale in this regrettable condition of human existence. Similarly, like war, it could be argued that terrorism is also merely a continuation of a political commerce by additional means. It is a strategy used in a larger political effort. Which is why, perhaps, the issue should be *when* and under *what* circumstances to implement, rather than *if* to implement it—just as it is the case with the phenomenon of war. To illustrate the point and to mention perhaps the most obvious example, the history shows us that many separatist movements possessed a great deal of legitimacy and popular support regardless of implementing the tactics of terror; and so did the underground movements and partisans fighting the occupying forces during the Second World War.

The state, at least in theory, enjoys the monopoly of the legitimate use of force and in many cases has a technological as well as a financial advantage to the non-state actors, who, when (feeling) excluded from the political discourse, naturally seek to implement unorthodox, cost-efficient strategies to fight either the state or other non-state (domestic or foreign) actors struggling for power in order to further their own political agenda.

Many authors also argue, that ‘growing multiplicity of the identities available to individuals in the contemporary [globalized] world feeds into a growing sense of radical social uncertainty, which can—at times—lead to anxiety and [even extreme] violence’ (Demmers, 2012, p. 19). Martyrdom might be viewed as the ultimate means of empowering an individual who is all by himself weak in terms of legitimate participation in a society, but is—by the means of terrorism or suicide bombing—capable of discharging ones ‘creative’ and destructive potential in an act, in which ones political aspirations and *will to power* is satisfied.

3.6 Means & Ends

This is precisely why I would argue that terrorists in general, suicide bombers included, are rational actors, for they, whether directly or indirectly, pursue a certain political agenda. And the pursuit of this agenda, whether by the means that are legal or not, simply aims to promote or attain a certain goal. Even if the strategy of suicide bombing were to be proven insufficient or even contra-productive to the attainment of the goal set by an organisation, the actors

themselves remain rational for the decision to implement the strategy of terror or suicide bombing was a result of rational, organised deliberation by the political elite of the organisation. Based on the specific situation and information available to those elites, the strategy is perceived as a viable means in order to pursue a certain political end. Whether the desired political goal is in the end attained, or not is from the rationality's point of view irrelevant.

It is important to keep in mind, that as much as I consider the strategy of terrorism in general, and suicide bombing in particular, to be rational, the rationality of particular actors in particular acts—actual people doing the bombing—is, *perhaps*, more questionable than the one of the political elites making the decision. Nevertheless it appears that 'suicide bombers are both rich and poor and display roughly the same psychological range of profiles as the general population. If anything, Suicide bombers are more likely to be better educated than the general population and less likely to be psychologically impaired' (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smith, 2011, p. 215).

I believe we have now sufficiently demonstrated that even terrorism as a strategy (as a part of a larger, broader struggle that attempts to attain a specific political goal or objective) fits into Clausewitz's theory of war for we know that terrorists have a certain political agenda—which means their actions are politically motivated. Terrorist groups in general also fit into the framework of trinity and *trinitarian warfare* for they are necessarily governed by Clausewitz's *trinity*, which is—as we have discussed in the beginning of this chapter—a dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, rational calculation, and the play of chance.

But leaving the strategy of terrorism behind, let us examine the relevance of Clausewitz's trinity to the contemporary trend of an *anti-modern* war. Consider for a moment the contemporary trend of *asymmetric warfare* and the structure of the non-state actors. The reproach is that Clausewitz's theory of war is state-centred and thus unable to explain 'small wars' and conflict taking place within the state and concerning non-state actors. But even if we viewed Clausewitz's trinity in terms of the state and its components, when it comes to low-intensity, inter-state conflict, as John Stone says in his article *Clausewitz's Trinity and Contemporary Conflict*, 'all we need to do is replace Clausewitz's state-based labels with a set that better describes their functional equivalents among the relevant non-state actors. Thus *government*, *army* and *people* might be replaced by *leaders*, *fighters* and *supporters*, and the Trinity is back in business' (Stone, 2007, p. 284).

Terrorists also have to rely on public support in order to gain and sustain recruits, funds, certain legitimacy and even protection. Under the normal circumstances, reason would prescribe that it is safer for one to use the maximum force possible against one's belligerent for in times of war—due to the complex character of armed forces and all the necessary activities—one is not capable to foresee all the possible outcomes as well as the countering force used by one's enemy. However, though it may not appear to be the case, terrorists in general do not want a lot of people dead, but a lot of people watching (Jenkins, 2006, p. 118). History is filled with organisations that 'went too far' with their activities, resulting in a loss of public support and eventually their oblivion. Apart from friction, this natural restraint of the influence of reason—war's subordination to politics that exercises great amount of influence on both the planning (the decision to wage) as well as the actual conduct of war—presents the second modifying principle that prevents war from attaining its absolute state. This brings us to the fact that even if we stick to the original interpretation of the trinity intended by Clausewitz, there is no doubt that inter-state conflict (including terrorism) is shaped by a dynamic and inherently unstable interaction of the forces of *violent emotion*, *rational calculation*, and the *play of chance*.

3.7 Moral & Physical Forces in War

In an attempt to lift the fog of war and diminish friction, along with specialised and extensive training procedures and advanced level of organisation, modern militaries have turned to technology. It is true that in many ways, technology makes, or at least attempts to make war more efficient, safe and predictable. Nevertheless I shall argue that, from the perspective of the personnel, for every single advantage brought by the innovation in technology, there exists at least a single disadvantage, making the war, if not the same as it had ever been, then more messy, more complicated and more psychologically challenging for the participants. On a regular soldier, modern warfare takes its toll in terms of variety of additional skills and knowledge he or she must master in order to be able to effectively participate in combat as well as additional stress from prolonged deployment, battles and fire fights. When it comes to leadership, nowadays the time flows faster than it used to. The speed with which you are able to gain intelligence and the speed with which the intelligence can lose its currency places ever-greater emphasis on the ability of rapid situation-evaluation and decision-making, that calls for even greater qualities of mind and temperament presented in Clausewitz's concept of genius.

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Even though technological (qualitative) superiority might provide a huge advantage on the operational level, the situation is different on the level of strategy where Western societies seem to be lacking behind in fighting non-state actors and terrorist groups. There are cases and situations when technology alone will simply not do the trick. Once again, history is full of examples when the combination of regular and irregular forces with additional help from outside or people who were poorly equipped but highly motivated fighting in a familiar environment defeated even the disproportionately materially superior armies of the world's leading superpowers (Vietnam, Afghanistan etc.). Also consider, for example, how on the September 11, 2001, a relatively small group of poorly equipped, though sufficiently funded and well motivated people, was able to deliver a devastating blow to the most powerful country in the world, for a moment rendering all of its battleships and fighter jets i.e. superiority of technological advancement irrelevant. All of such lessons, like Clausewitz, emphasize the importance of moral forces that lie at the heart of war, as well as the importance of winning the hearts and minds of local populations if the results of the military operations are to last.

CHAPTER 4: War & The (Contemporary) World Order

4.1 Before Clausewitz

In accordance with the historical perspectivism and principles of hermeneutics we briefly discussed in the first chapter, one has to look into the past in order to be able understand the present and vice versa. In order to understand the technical and operational issues discussed in the previous chapter, along with its implications and the changing character of war, we must consider the larger context of international system and international relations. This is why we are now going to go through some of the particular changes and evolution of the international order, as well as the evolution in the understanding of war, in order to be able to put the issues discussed in the previous chapter into a bigger picture and in the end, perhaps even question the prevailing understanding of the phenomenon of war as instrumental, serving political interests of particular states, groups and actors.

As George Schwab notes in his translation of Carl Schmitt's *The Concept of the Political*, when we look at the ancient Greece in Plato's *Republic* (Bk. V, CH. XVI, 470), we see the strong emphasis he puts on the distinction and contrast between the public enemy and the private one. This distinction, however, is illustrated with the antithesis of the phenomenon labelled as 'war' and the ones called 'rebellions', 'upheavals', or 'civil wars'.

It appears to me that just as different names are used, war and faction, so two things also exist and the names apply to differences in these two. The two things I mean are, on the one hand, what is one's own and akin, and what is alien, and foreign, on the other. Now the name faction is applied to the hatred of one's own, war to the hatred of the alien... I assert that the Greek stock is with respect to itself its own and akin, with respect to the barbaric, foreign and alien... Then when Greeks fight with barbarians and barbarians with Greeks, we'll assert they are at war and are enemies by nature, and this hatred must be called war; while when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we'll say that they are by nature friends, but in this case Greece is sick and factious, and this kind of hatred must be called faction (The Republic of Plato, 1991, p.150).

The text suggests that, for Plato, real war is only between Hellens and Barbarians, who are 'by nature enemies'. The idea behind the argument is that 'a people cannot wage war against itself and a civil war is only a self-laceration and it does not signify that perhaps a new state or even a new people is being created' (2007, pp. 28,29).

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When it comes to evolution of states, evolution of international order in Europe, as well as bifurcation and duality of constructive and destructive effects of violence it is perhaps best summarised in Charles Tilly's *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, especially in its third chapter *How War Made States, and Vice Versa* (Tilly, 1993, pp. 67-95). But Howard's book *The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War* examines not only the evolution of the international system, but focuses extensively on the changing nature of the understanding and perception of the phenomenon of war. Howard is a prominent British military historian and founder of the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He is also one of the leading interpreters of the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and, along with American historian Peter Paret, he worked on the translation of the edition of *On War* used in this thesis. This is precisely why his work on the invention of peace and reinvention of war is cited extensively throughout this chapter.

The medieval order in Europe between the eighth and the eighteenth centuries, 'was largely a matter of a successful symbiosis between the ruling warrior class that provided order and the clerisy that legitimized it' (Howard, 2002, p. 6). Strong and powerful families—posterity of the successful warrior leaders—presented the political elite in charge of a society, whose structure was based on the assumption of permanent war resulting from the constant threat of barbaric invaders, and legitimized by the church providing a divine sanction for the existing order, as well as well-educated officials for the administration, stemming from the viewpoint that life was a 'test'. As Howard puts it:

The church had to solve the problem of reconciling a doctrine of a divine order, in which all differences were reconciled and to which the concept of peace was basic, with the reality of a war-torn world in which its very survival depended on the protection and favour of successful warlords. The solution had been found by St Augustine in the fourth century. War, he taught, had to be accepted as part of the fallen condition of man, who was simultaneously a citizen of the City of God and of a worldly kingdom which, with all its imperfections, played an essential part in the divine purpose and could therefore rightly impose its own obligations (Howard, 2002, pp. 8, 9).

Christianity adopted the maxim *vita es militia super terram*, which could loosely be translated as 'life is struggle upon Earth', thus stabilizing society, legitimizing the political order and justifying war against the enemies of Christendom.

War was thus recognized as an intrinsic part of the social and political order, and the warrior was accepted as a servant of God, his sword as a symbol of the Cross. A culture of chivalry developed

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around the role and activities of the knight, that had little to do with the brute realities of war, and nothing whatsoever with wars against the infidel which could be, and were, fought with unrestrained brutality (Howard, 2002, p. 10).

Here too, we see the 'Us' and 'Them' conception of a society, built along the lines of the friend/enemy antithesis promoted by Schmitt.

After the seemingly endless tides of invaders diminished, and eventually seemed to have vaporized altogether, Europe found itself under the rule of a vast multitude of lords. And without the external enemy to unite them, they engaged in endless disputes over influence, property and material gains. War became effectively transformed from an inherent part of existence and a necessary struggle for survival, into a mere form of litigation—a petty tool of self-interest in a struggle for power limited only by the resources of the litigants.

In the chapter War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, Charles Tilly describes how the rise of the nation states, their aspiration to monopolize the legitimate exercise of violence within the state and the protection of its own citizens brought a relative peace and stability into the system. This meant that people could focus on long-term projects and trade. This resulted in a boom of new ideas and innovations followed by sustained economic growth, which is necessary step in the history and a substantial part of modern capitalistic society. (Tilly, 1985, p. 177) Furthermore, in order for governments to be able to provide the protection for their subjects, they had to efficiently raise a lot of money, which led to the improvement of the system of taxation, which resulted in strong centralized governments with strong institutions.

Each of the major uses of violence produced characteristic forms of organization. War making yielded armies, navies, and supporting services. State making produced durable instruments of surveillance and control within the territory. Protection relied on the organization of war making and state making but added to in an apparatus by which the protected called forth the protection that was their due, notably through courts and representative assemblies. Extraction brought fiscal and accounting structures into being. The organization and deployment of violence themselves account for much of the characteristic structure of European states (Tilly, 1985, p. 181).

So, in order to wage expensive wars, princes and governments had to raise money by loans, or taxation of their subjects, who attempted to receive some sort of political concessions in return. The success varied from one 'society' to another. But the overall trend in the growing

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intercourse between princes and their subjects resulted into a formation of the state—a new entity as the basis for the international order termed by the political scientists as a ‘system of states’. ‘Indeed, the entire apparatus of the state primarily came into being to enable princes to wage war’... ‘The result was almost continuous warfare in western Europe from the early sixteenth until the mid-seventeenth centuries’ (Howard, 2002, pp. 11-15). The birth of this second new world order is generally considered to be the year 1648, after the Peace of Westphalia effectively established the sovereign state as both the ultimate guarantor of the domestic order, as well as the legitimiser of external war. Henceforward the relations between the states shaped the history of Europe. This new order, retrospectively referred to as the *ancien régime*, was a mutually supportive trinity of monarchy, church and aristocracy. Although sovereign, the success of the regime depended on prince’s ability to balance and mitigate the aristocracy’s attempts to power through various favours and exclusive court positions and at the same time using the power and influence of aristocracy to balance and mitigate the attempts of merchants, craftsmen and urban bourgeoisie to improve their position in a society. The important change—that initially began as an elaborate scheme to take power from the aristocracy—were the commissions of royal armies that were now raised, trained and paid by the state, swearing allegiance to the Crown. Litigations and limited warfare, deemed decadent by some and civilised by other, continued, reinforcing the Westphalian concept of international order.

4.2 Making of the Contemporary World Order

Although the princes of the stagnant *ancien régime* still tried to draw their prestige and legitimacy from their glorious warrior ancestors, the regime grew inefficient, unable to accommodate the changing needs voiced from below. Its days were numbered. It grew so inefficient and decadent that, to many, it seemed as though the regime presented the only restraint to human potential and happiness. The regime got blamed for everything. This resulted in the major shift in the perception of human condition presenting humanity with unlimited possibilities. ‘It was commonly accepted by the enlightened *philosophes* that men were naturally good but had been corrupted by institutions; and once those institutions had been reformed, natural virtue would reassert itself and mankind would live at peace’ (Howard, 2002, p. 30). There was one philosopher, whose views on humanity and its future prospects were somewhat more sober, yet still quite optimistic. His name was Immanuel Kant. He believed that men

were built out of ‘crooked timber’, out of which nothing straight could be made... War would still continue, warned Kant. But gradually its growing horror and expense would disincline peoples from waging it, and ultimately compel them to abandon the anarchical condition that prevailed among states and enter instead a ‘league of nations’, which would provide collectively the security that at present each sought individually (Howard, 2002, p. 30).

As Howard notes, at least in Europe, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, ‘the preservation of peace came to be seen as the preservation of a balance of powers’ (Howard, 2002, p. 24) that had to be constantly adjusted by wars. ‘States had an intrinsic right to go to war when they thought it necessary, and state policy was a perfectly adequate *jus ad bellum*... What mattered was *jus in bello*; to conduct war in such a manner as to do the least possible damage to international society as a whole, and make possible the conclusion of a stable peace. (Howard, 2002, pp. 24, 25).

The so called ‘rationalisation of war’—transferring focus on *jus in bello* and the limited warfare, understanding of war as instrumental tools of policy and a *mere* continuation of political commerce by additional means—meant that the leaders of the Enlightenment ‘saw war [quite rightfully] not as part of the natural order or a necessary instrument of state power, but as a foolish anachronism, perpetuated only by those who enjoyed or profited by it’ (Howard, 2002, p. 26).

This sentiment, broadly shared among the lower classes and members of intelligentsia, served as a bonding element giving rise to nationalist movements resulting in the French revolution. After getting rid of the *ancien regime* at home, the nationalist mobs set to spread the revolution and liberate the neighbouring countries as well.

The *ancien régime* may have engaged in war as a matter of course, but those wars were kept limited by all manner of cultural constraints, not least their expense. The French revolution not only loosened the purse strings but released manpower on a scale that made it possible to field large armies, first of volunteers and later of conscripts, who were not trained, disciplined, paid or supplied on the scale of the old professionals (Howard, 2002, p. 33).

Two new phenomena resulted from the above-mentioned changes in the constitution of military. On the one hand the armies were officered by men who earned their promotions by their merits and talents instead of birth, which meant that they were led by capable men with military genius. On the other hand, due to the bankrupt government at home, the forces of liberation quickly changed into forces of conquest and domination as soldiers decided to

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collect the rewards for their service by looting and plundering abroad. As the Napoleonic armies advanced, as a side effect, they helped to create, or to strengthen, the sense of national identities abroad, for nothing helps to promote the friend/enemy antithesis better than foreign soldiers plundering your backyard. Thus the 'Napoleonic era saw not only the development of organized warfare by land and sea, *la grande guerre*, on the largest scale ever seen, but also of *guerrilla* war; wars of peoples against occupying armies' (Howard, 2002, p. 37).

4.3 The Clausewitz Paradigm

These turbulent times were the times when Carl von Clausewitz lived, served in the military and wrote his thesis. Based on his first-hand experience in the military, as well as his brilliant analytical mind and sharp reflections, his work presents a critical analysis of his contemporary state of affairs, in which he tried to come up with a collection of thoughts and insights that would present a sort of a manual enabling an attentive reader to attain a profound understanding of the phenomenon of war.

After first-handily experiencing the military defeats inflicted by the 'revolutionaries', Clausewitz, as well as many other educated people in Prussia and Germany realised, 'that their military defeat and political humiliation had been due not only to the incompetence of an army hitherto regarded as the best in the world, but also to their inability to match the commitment and enthusiasm that had inspired the armies of Napoleon' (Howard, 2002, p. 39).

His writing perfectly reflects the times he lived in. From the introduction of nationalist sentiments, technological advancement—the use of firearms and heavy artillery—through the central position of nation-states in the international community to the birth of the partisans and guerrilla warfare—wars of peoples against occupying armies—these were the times that represent the beginning of the world as we know it.

Although refuting the instrumentalist notion of war allegedly taught by Clausewitz in the previous chapters, it remains that if he had not himself (unwillingly) created, he had most definitely helped to introduce a dangerous paradigm in the realm of politics—understanding of war as a *mere* continuation of politics by other means. This faith is shared by great many other European thinkers particularly Niccolò Machiavelli, who expressed his awareness of the

human tendency for this particular kind of ‘blindness’ as well as the potentiality of using it to ones advantage by saying:

Men in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to come in close touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are. And those few dare not gainsay the many who are backed by the majesty of the state (The Prince, 2003, p. 58).

4.4 Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War

This misinterpretation of Clausewitz is also recognized by Carl Schmitt, when he says in *The Concept of the Political* that ‘the military battle itself is not the “continuation of politics by other means” as the famous term of Clausewitz is generally incorrectly cited’ (2007, pp. 33,34).

As discussed in the second chapter, Clausewitz does not talk much about politics, which is quite striking considering that he wrote an entire book and based his whole theory of war around the definition of war being subordinated to politics, or better to say ‘a continuation of policy by other means’ without taking much effort in discussing what policy and politics is. Nevertheless, taking his enormous impact on the things political into consideration, one must necessarily think about Clausewitz as a political philosopher. His definition, and subsequent theory, emphasises that war does not suspend political intercourse. It does not change it into something entirely different either. So what is politics in the context of war?

In the first chapter, we have already established the basic purpose and the fundamental act of government, which, according to Gabriele Dufour, ‘aims at defending society itself or as embodied in the government against its internal or external enemies, overt or covert, present or future...’ (Dufour, 1868, p. 128).

In order to subsidize for this minor imperfection, this thesis attempts to interpret Clausewitz’s *theory of war* in the light of Carl Schmitt’s *theory of the political*, which at the same time, along with other works of Carl Schmitt, serves the purpose of describing the transformation of the understanding of the phenomenon of war from Clausewitz’s time to our contemporary society. Schmitt also read—and wrote extensively—on Clausewitz, which is why his works are extensively cited in this chapter.

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Alain de Benoist claims that Schmitt does not maintain Clausewitz's formula and that he in fact 'adopts a position close to that of Clausewitz, but which should not be confused with it,' for 'it tends rather to complete it and to go beyond it' (Benoist, 2013, p. 21).

According to Schmitt, the very essence of politics consists, not so much in hostility, but in the possibility to differentiate between public friends and public enemies *prior* to the actual confrontation—in respect to the potential conflict. His concept of the political rests on the friend-enemy antithesis (grouping) that has been briefly discussed above, in the beginning of this chapter. War could be said to be a state of emergency. In this way, war certainly is the extension of politics, for politics, according to Schmitt inherently—by its very nature and definition based on the friend-enemy antithesis—implies hostility. Nevertheless, war cannot be reduced to being a *mere* 'continuation of politics by other means' for it has its own essence.

War has its own strategic, tactical, and other rules and points of view, but they all presuppose that the political decision has already been made as to who the enemy is. In war the adversaries most often confront each other openly; normally they are identifiable by a uniform, and the distinction of friend and enemy is therefore no longer a political problem, which the fighting soldier has to solve... War is [therefore] neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior... What always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or has not arrived. (Schmitt, 2007, pp. 34, 35).

One should always hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. Nevertheless, when it comes to the political enemy, Schmitt explicitly emphasizes, that he

need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible (Schmitt, 2007, p. 27).

The most fundamental element of the political conception of hostility presented by Schmitt, is that the (political) enemy must be regarded politically. He must remain a political enemy, whom one must fight, but at the same time, he must remain a one with whom one can one day make peace. 'In the perspective of *jus publicum europaeum*, peace clearly remains the aim of war: every war is naturally concluded by a peace treaty. And, as it is only with an enemy that one can make peace, that implies that the belligerents *mutually recognise one another*'

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(Benoist, 2013, p. 22). ‘War between states is thus a fundamentally a symmetrical war. It is modelled on the duel [see Clausewitz’s definition of war: War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale], in which the adversaries mutually recognise each other’s equality and both observe the rules of the same code’ (Benoist, 2013, p. 23). This has to do with the formal concept of the *justus hostis* of the recognised enemy—a key concept for Schmitt that refers to a ‘just enemy’. Such recognition is the very condition that makes peace possible, because without recognising your enemy as equal and ‘just’, there can be no peace treaty. ‘This is why Schmitt affirms that an absolute war, a total war, would be a disaster from a strictly political point of view since, by attempting to annihilate the enemy, it eliminates the element which constitutes politics’ (Benoist2013, p. 22).

The problem arises when a state loses the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and when the authority ceases to be sovereign and is unable to enforce order within its own territory. The same problem occurs when an occupying force focuses excessively on, and prioritises, physical over moral aspects in war and is thus unable to win the hearts and minds of local populations. The enemy ceases to be visible, the conflict ceases to be symmetrical. It ceases to be modelled on a duel, for in an attempt to gain legitimacy, the adversaries do not recognise each other’s equality, and they most certainly do not observe the rules of the same code. The belligerents have a different kind of organising structure, different priorities, as well as a different access to a different kind of resources, all of which compel them to act in a different manner (consider for example the terror tactics discussed in the previous chapter).

In the beginning of *The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War (1937)*, Carl Schmitt proclaims the history of the international war to be the history of the concept of war. He continues by saying that ‘international law is, after all, a “a right of war and peace,” *jus belli ac pacis*, and will remain such as long as it remains a law between independent peoples organized into states – so long, in other words, as war is a war between states and not an international civil war’ (Schmitt, 2011, p. 31).

According to Schmitt, ‘the problem of the discriminating concept of war entered history of modern international law with President Wilson’s declaration of war on April 2, 1917, under which he led his country into the world war against Germany’ (Schmitt, 2011, p. 31).

This created a dangerous precedent that has led, along with general, universalist aspirations of the ‘heirs of the Enlightenment’ to the creation of supranational institutions, including The Geneva League of Nations and—more importantly, I shall argue—its contemporary successor The United Nations, that, despite the rhetoric, attempts to disregard the centrality of a state in the international system as an obsolete, and virtually medieval matter. This tendency is

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manifested in a variety of authoritative claims and decisions, but most importantly by embracing, promoting and imposing the discriminating concept of war onto the international community. It also attempts to establish an individual as a lone subject of international law, and thus a direct member of the international community – making one simultaneously a citizen of a state and, more importantly, a citizen of the world. However, this attempt to create an international community and the establishment of the mechanism of universal human rights that would surpass the authority of sovereign states has not lead to the creation of what Kant called ‘perpetual peace’—to the abolition of coercion and violence—but rather to its ‘collectivisation’ and ‘denationalisation’. To this, the heirs of the enlightenment would reply ‘Not yet!’, and that ‘This is just a beginning!’, or that ‘Rome wasn’t built in a day!’

Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to do away with the anarchy of the international system. However, according to Schmitt, it is quite obvious that ‘old orders are unravelling just as no new ones come to replace them’ (Schmitt, 2011, p. 31). The proponents of the turn to the discriminating concept of war present it as a work of progress that does away with the anarchy of the international system, brings justice and order, helps build a better, safer world. When in fact it looks only as if somebody did not like the way the table was set and thus decided to turn it over. Though anarchic from the very beginning, for the international system lacked any authority higher than a nation state, the turn to the discriminating concept of war only helped create a system of legitimisation in the name of a higher principle, when in fact it only promotes a conception of justice as an advantage of the stronger.

This criticism of the League of Nations, and the tendency it represents, could be perhaps compared to the one presented in one of the lectures of Edward Hallett Carr from 14 October 1936, in which he criticized the League’s inefficiency and stated:

I do not believe the time is ripe...for the establishment of a super-national force to maintain order in the international community and I believe any scheme by which nations should bind themselves to go to war with other nations for the preservation of peace is not only impracticable, but retrograde... If European democracy binds its living body to the putrefying corpse of the 1919 settlement [a reference to the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles], it will merely be committing a particularly unpleasant form of suicide (cf. Cox, 2010, p. 53).

In his book *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, Carr criticizes the British, as well as American scholars and intellectuals for largely ignoring the role of power in international politics (Carr, 2001). This position is shared by John J. Mearsheimer in his article *E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The*

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Battle Rages On, where he claims that this powerful bias against realism ‘is intellectually foolhardy and hurts not only students but the idealist scholars who so dislike realism’ (Mearsheimer, 2013, p. 139).

Carl Schmitt was also eager to explore the power relations behind the façade and shed light onto the real motivations behind the idealist rhetoric. He maintains that The Geneva League of Nations [as well as its more elaborate contemporary successor – the United Nations] presents a mere system of legalisation that monopolises the judgment on the ‘just’ war. ‘It bestows the momentous decision on the justice or injustice of war – a decision tied with the turn to the discriminating concept of war – upon certain powers’ (Schmitt, 2011, pp. 31, 32). This means that there ceases to be a possibility of a legal indifference towards war, which leads to the abolition of neutrality and the non-discriminating concept of war. In fact it ends up blurring the distinction between peace and war altogether—setting up condition for the international civil war.

In order to better illustrate the ideas and principles behind this whole enterprise, it should be sufficient to take a look at the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

We the peoples of the united nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to *reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights*, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the *equal rights* of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which *justice* and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in *larger freedom*, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in *peace* with one another as *good neighbours*, and to unite *our* strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that *armed force shall not be used*, save in the *common interest*, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of *all peoples*, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims [emphasis added] (United Nations, 1945).

After the treaty of Versailles, within the Geneva League of Nations and the United Nations, there cannot exist a legal indifference towards wars. Schmitt saw a major problem in the above tendencies and developments in the international system, for

when today a state or group of states gives up this fundamental non-discriminating behavior, and takes steps to war in such a way that distinguishes just parties from unjust parties in the eyes of the third

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party, that claim is implicitly made that one acts not only in one's own name [and interest], but also in that of the higher [trans-state or universal] order and community... [And] as soon as the conception of possible neutrality and the possibility of a non-partisan "third" state is negated, a claim is implicitly made to universal or regional authority (Schmitt, 2011, p. 65).

First of all, no matter what, one should always be weary and suspicious of the one proclaiming to be acting in the universal interest. And second of all

when an order of international law built out of nation-states and founded, on the one hand, on the concept of *state* as the final decision-maker when it comes to the state's *jus belli* and, on the other hand, on the logically consistent non-discriminating concept of war and neutrality exists, then the introduction of an authoritative policy of discrimination fundamentally questions the validity of not only the non-discriminating concept of war, but also *any* concept of war (Schmitt, 2011, p. 65).

This means that if there are 'just' wars, there are also 'unjust'. And if we are fighting a war that is just it must necessarily mean that we are the good ones, whereas our adversaries must, by the nature of the same principle, be seen as evil. War as such is also deemed to be evil and unacceptable, something that only a 'bad guy'—an aggressor—would do, whereas a 'good guy' conducts merely 'interventions' or 'counter-insurgency operations', either to prevent and act of 'aggression' or to respond to one. Either way the 'good' guy tries to portray himself as a champion of humanity fighting for the higher, universal principle.

Schmitt maintains that all attempts to introduce a discriminating concept of war into international law runs into two great contradictions for, on the one hand, there is the irreconcilability of every concept of war with the claim to a new order; and, on the other hand, there is also the irreconcilability of universalism (embodied in the UN) and federalism (particular states) in the current crisis of international law.

This is simply nonsense, according to Schmitt, for

As soon as a decision that regards the legality or illegality of wars or the permissibility of wars is taken to apply to third parties, the unity of the concept of war is exploded, leaving behind it on the one hand the just war permitted by international law and, on the other, the unjust, impermissible "war"...

These two concepts actually represent two wars, each of which means something totally different and contrary and therefore cannot be described with the same term – "war" – as each other's

counterpart. Justice and injustice cannot be legally bound to the same concept'...

A recognized legal act and a recognized illegal act cannot, within the same legal order, constitute one and the same legal concept. That would be just as unthinkable as if a state attempted to classify the fight between the police and the criminal, or the illegal military attack and the act of justified self-defense, as a unified legal constitution that had a "legal side" and an "illegal side." By the same token, as long as a legal order allows an act like the duel or recognizes it as a legal construction, this same legal order can perceive certain disputes as "non-duels"; this same legal order could, for example, designate a dispute as a mere punishable act of bodily harm. But what this legal order cannot do is, insofar as duels exist, distinguish between "just" and "unjust" duels (Schmitt, 2011, p. 66).

International law and community is inconsistent for they neither remain tied to the 'obsolete' concepts of war and neutrality nor do they replace these old concepts with truly new ones.

'As soon as an order of international law – in other words, a trans-state order of international law that can distinguish between justified and unjustified wars in a way authoritative for third parties – makes this sort of distinction between the "just" and "unjust" duel, or the "just" and "unjust" war, an armed action on the side of justice is nothing else than the realization of justice. This is true whether this takes shape in the form of an execution, sanction, international justice, police, or whatever the case may be... On the unjustified side of the war, however, such acts are rebellion against a legal action: thus rebellion or a crime, and certainly something else than the obsolete legal institution of "war" (Schmitt, 2011, pp. 66, 67).

It is one thing when a community of states—a federation—decides to take a decision regarding a particular policy—conduct of war—that is to be authoritative, or even legally binding to the members of that particular community. 'This idea remains valid as long as there exists a political organization equipped with a *jus belli*. But the concept of the federation presupposes the renunciation of the *jus belli* within the federation' (Schmitt, 2011, p. 71).

But 'should a closed group of states belonging to the federation make the claim to conduct a just war, this claim is, from the standpoint of international law, unauthoritative to the non-member state' (Schmitt, 2011, p. 70). 'And should one attempt to do away with the *jus belli* in such a way that affects not only members of the federation but third-party states outside it, the implicit claim of such a federation is no longer one of international law, but rather one of universalistic rule over the new world order' (Schmitt, 2011, p. 71).

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One cannot interdict a nation. Or as Thomas Hobbes say in *Behemoth: History of the Causes of Civil Wars of England* ‘when a Pope excommunicates a whole nation, methinks he rather excommunicates himself than them’ (Hobbes, 2007, p. 172).

As Benoist noted—especially in the context of the so called ‘war on terror’—‘we are witnessing a revealing blurring of the distinction between police and army: while the police are increasingly made to uphold international order by military means, the army undertakes wars which are regularly presented as international police actions’ (Benoist, 2013, p. 32). As emphasized by Schmitt on many occasions, these tendencies to wage a ‘just war’ inevitably lead to civil wars by the virtue of the fact that the enemy is perceived to be evil, a wrongdoer, or simply inferior and thus the very operation to deal with the ‘criminal’ is proclaimed to be something different than war, something exceptional that calls for exceptional measures, making possible for such operations to be conducted without consideration of the rules of the *jus in bello*. May the need arise, the rhetoric could be simply adjusted accordingly. Nevertheless, in these settings, under the contemporary state of affairs justice is always relative and, appear as it may, always serving the interest of the stronger. Once again: ‘Caesar dominus et supra grammaticam’ [the emperor is also the master of grammar].

The phenomenon that, perhaps best, illustrates the partition from the original understanding of war, as well as war in Clausewitz’s understanding—and only underlines the prevailing turn to the discriminating concept of war, blurring of the boundaries between waging war and policing, and our heading towards the state of international civil war as foretold by Carl Schmitt—is the way the rhetoric regarding war is used and abused by political elites.

Perhaps the greatest error in contemporary discourse—as well as praxeology—concerning war rests in claiming, and actually attempting to wage ‘wars on drugs’, ‘wars on terror’ and the like. These usages might have originally been considered as mere figures of speech, nevertheless, the rising popularity in using the term ‘war’ in a vast variety of contexts has created confusion and ambiguity and even change in the way we understand war. To illustrate the point, while keeping in mind Schmitt’s prophesy regarding the international civil war, consider the relationship between the United States of America and Taliban and the mixed feelings—even outrage—among the public over the idea of negotiations and peace talks between the two adversaries. Why is the idea of negotiations and peace talks so controversial when the aim of the negotiating aim is no lesser than for Taliban to reject al-Qaida, end its insurgency in Afghanistan and recognise women’s rights in the country? The problem lies precisely in the fact that the Taliban is not considered as a legitimate political enemy, but

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rather as and evil criminal. In 1996 and 1998, Bin Laden declared war against the United States. After the 9/11, the United States responded with a declaration of war on terrorism.

For Clausewitz, however, war ‘is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total non-resistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living forces’ (1989, p. 128). War’s nature is violent, interactive, and fundamentally political. I am certain that the violent nature of war does not need to be addressed any further. The political nature, both according to Clausewitz and Schmitt, means that war actually has an end. And, perhaps the most important characteristic nature of war, is that there has to be a certain degree of interaction involved. Otherwise it would lead to an extreme. Once again, consider Carl Schmitt’s prophecy regarding the development towards an international civil war, or the extreme measures taken by western democracies in an attempt to wage a war on terror that have, arguably, larger (negative) impact on domestic populations than on adversaries it attempts to fight.

Ironically enough, present state of affairs of the international system has it that instead of *uniting* nations into a community, the United Nation and various other supra-national institutions, as well as individual statesmen, thinkers businessmen and professional politicians try to introduce universal standards of ‘humanity’—an authoritative, normative, prescriptive, universalist, *homogenous* conception of the world order—on a *heterogeneous* world. Despite the elaborate rhetoric and sophistry, these attempts do not serve any ‘universal’ interests of the international community, but rather the ones of powerful—mainly Western—nations that in these institutions see powerful means that are necessary in order to both legalise and legitimise their actions in the contemporary word ‘ruled’ by public opinion. Taking the overall situation of the international system into account, along with its current tendencies and trends, the present state of affairs does not present a system that would be ‘better than nothing’, but rather a system that presents a major obstacle standing in the path of a *true* community of nations.

4.5 The Metaphysics of War

The instrumental understanding of war—as a form of litigation, i.e. as a *mere* continuation of politics—dominates our modern (Western) thinking. Although it was already very much present in Clausewitz’s time, he was aware that this kind of understanding would get you nowhere closer to understanding the phenomenon itself. Arguably, in general, the situation seems to be improving when it comes to variety of approaches that are taken in order to

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understand the phenomenon of war. There appears to be a rising interest in the academic study of war, which, in recent years, has reflected in the emergence of various departments that deal with violence, armed conflict, and war. This is a good thing, for it gives justice to the phenomenon of war, because it restores the sense of its gravity among professionals, academics, as well as relative laymen, and because it underlines the centrality of the position of war in the international system. Once again, hope for the best but prepare for the worst.

Nevertheless, the ‘Western’ instrumentalist understanding and ethnocentrism seem to dominate the discourse, limiting both the way we are capable of understanding people from different cultures and backgrounds; as well limiting our capability of fighting adversaries with different philosophical backgrounds. I mention philosophy and metaphysics because on numerous occasions, Clausewitz emphasized the fact that war is to be considered an *art*, rather than a *science*. This has to do with the understanding shared by numerous other thinkers, such as Machiavelli, as well as many other, later theorists and revolutionaries such as Mao and Che Guevara—the understanding of the inherent, fundamental superiority of *mind* to *matter*. ‘To understand war from the most simple model, one must recognise its nature – war is a relation between human wills – and its specific character, the resort to physical violence’ (Aron, 1986, p. 117).

As we have demonstrated earlier, this also applies to our modern era of advanced technology, where a small, ill equipped, yet highly motivated group of organised fighters is capable of inflicting severe damages to otherwise materially superior adversaries, achieving their political goal, and even causing whole societies to tremble and become ‘infected’ with fear. It is hard to fight the enemy who plays by a different set of rules. And it is even harder to fight an enemy that appears to be abiding by no rules whatsoever. This applies especially in cases of revolutions.

As Carl Schmitt puts it in his *Theory of the Partisan*...

the distinction between war (Woina) and play (Igra) is accentuated by Lenin himself in a marginal note to a passage in Chapter 23 of Clausewitz’s Book II (“Keys to the Country”). Its logic entails the decisive step that tears down the containments which the state war of European international law had managed to establish in the eighteenth century, and which had been successfully restored by the Congress of Vienna (1814/15), and had lasted through World War I. Clausewitz had not yet really considered their elimination. In comparison with a war of absolute enmity, the contained war of classical European international law, proceeding by recognized rules, is little more than a duel between cavaliers seeking

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satisfaction. To a communist like Lenin, imbued with absolute enmity, such a war could only appear to be a mere game, a game that he would play in order to mislead the enemy, but one which he basically despised and thought risible (Schmitt, 2007, p. 36).

Lenin ignored the ‘criminalization’ of war and in the framework of a philosophy of history inspired by Hegelian Marxism preached the gospel of a single war that would now to be just, making all belligerents equally belligerents—the war of working class against the capitalist states (Aron, 1986, p. 368).

As we have discussed at the very beginning, war according to Clausewitz is to serve a specific political purpose, therefore its end is always the attainment of that particular goal, and thus peace. ‘Clausewitz reserves the notion of victory for tactics. If strategy has one end, it could be summarized in a single word: peace. The end of strategy or of the conduct of the war is peace, not military victory, even though each of the belligerents clearly wants a different peace or conceives of peace in different terms’ (Aron, 1986, p. 97). But what if the ends of both belligerents are fundamentally, existentially incompatible?

In Clausewitz, ‘nowhere does disarmament or overthrow – the finality of war closest to its perfect form – imply annihilation, in the physical sense, of soldiers or the destruction of the country. The image remains that of throwing to the ground. A people, like wrestler, can rise up again: no decision is definitive’ (Aron, 1986, p. 109) and the result of war is thus never final. We can now see how revolutionaries, and many other individuals and political groups, might have a problem with this kind of struggle that merely perpetuates the present system and status quo and more than a true fight, reminds a game of chess.

As discussed in the first chapter, Humanity as such designates either a biological category in terms of a species or a philosophical one stemming from the tradition of Western thought. However, ‘from the socio-historical viewpoint, man as such does not exist, because his membership within humanity is always mediated by a particular cultural belonging’ (Benoist & Champetier, 2012, p. 25). The very essence of life and the very nature of humanity is embedded in a diversity that is fundamental to our existence. We vary on the level of individual as well as on the level of society.

It is only natural that different societies put different value, and thus emphasis on different things and therefore pursue different ends. This is precisely why peoples from one society may consider some actions or ways of life of peoples coming from different societies as ‘irrational’. However, as discussed in the section dealing with terrorism and the phenomenon

of suicide bombing, all policies are rational for they attempt to attain certain political goal by the means that are deemed to be most adequate at that particular time—nobody would willingly go against one's own interest and pursue one's goal in a way he deems to be inferior to other possibilities.

Reason always exerts 'a moderating influence on the character of warfare by virtue of the requirement it imposes on us to proportion the use of force to the value we place on victory (Stone, 2007, p. 286).

Ultimately, the costs we are willing to bear in war depend on how much winning means to us. It is our passion for victory that reason must balance against the projected costs of war. This explains why the same war aim can elicit very different degrees of effort from two different belligerents, or why one side can interpret the other as acting irrationally: in such cases it is because the value they attach to winning differs significantly between the two (Stone, 2007, p. 286).

4.6 The Concept of Heroism

Our contemporary era is a product of modernity—a political and philosophical movement of the last three centuries of Western history.

It is characterised primarily by five converging processes: *individualisation*, through the destruction of old forms of communal life; *massification*, through the adoption of standardised behaviour and lifestyles; *desacralisation*, through the displacement of the great religious narratives by a scientific interpretation of the world; *rationalisation*, through the domination of instrumental reason, the free market, and technical efficiency; and *universalisation*, through a planetary extension of a model of society postulated implicitly as the only rational possibility and thus as superior (Benoist & Champetier, 2012, p. 12).

Out of the contemporary era of modernity, a 'side effect' perceived as one of the main aspects of change in the character of war arises—the phenomenon often called 'post-heroism' or 'post-heroic warfare'. The concept assumes that heroic motivations no longer present fuel to the war enterprise. War, and fighting in general, no longer serves as an opportunity to overcome and prove oneself, which means that it ceases to produce public heroes and figures of reverence. Willingness to fight, kill and even to die for ones community is viewed either as an indicator of religious fundamentalism or nationalistic fanaticism, or as a stage of human

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history that has been overcome a long time ago. This ‘post-heroic’ condition has produced a dramatic decrease in the tolerance for casualties in war, especially in western societies.

We have discussed how these ‘developed’ societies are trying to lift the fog of war and minimise friction by the means of technology. It also serves as a means of decreasing casualties by either providing ones soldiers with a qualitative advantage—having better equipment—or putting the soldiers out of the harms way altogether—by deploying drones, aerial strikes and other means of fighting the adversary over a long/safe distance.

Unlike in the West, in many traditional societies around the world, the concept of heroism is very much alive. For example, the concept of *jihad*—involving inner struggle against one’s own weaknesses as well as well as an outward struggle against one’s external enemies is—is very much present in the tradition of Islam.

As discussed by Julius Evola in his *Metaphysics of War*,

war breaks the routine of comfortable life; by means of its severe ordeals, it offers a transfiguring knowledge of life, life according to death. The moment the individual succeeds in living as a hero, even if it is the final moment of his earthly life, weighs infinitely more on the scale of value than a protracted existence spent consuming monotonously among the trivialities of cities. From a spiritual point of view, these possibilities make up for the negative and destructive tendencies of war, which are one-sidedly and tendentiously highlighted by pacifist materialism. War makes one realise the relativity of human life and therefore also the law of a ‘more-than-life’, and thus war has always an anti-materialistic materialist value, a spiritual value (Evola, 2011, p. 21).

Regardless of your personal opinion on Evola’s statements and the concept of heroism, I shall argue that, unlike in western societies, a conception of heroism and heroic warfare is much more prevalent in traditional societies. I also agree with Evola when he says that ‘the one who experiences heroism spiritually is pervaded with a metaphysical tension, an impetus, whose object is “infinite”, and which, therefore, will carry him perpetually forward, beyond the capacity of one who fights from necessity, fights as a trade, or is spurred by natural instincts or external suggestion’ (Evola, 2011, p. 21). This means that traditional societies possess a significant qualitative advantage in the matter of war. An advantage that surpasses any technological advantage possessed by the societies of modernity, which is why anyone interested in the issue of war should be necessarily interested in the concept of heroism.

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In the previous chapters, we have also discussed examples of conflicts, in which the superiority in technology simply will not make the difference – consider the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or for example the case of the former Yugoslavia—aerial strikes that could not prevent the mass murder and genocide happening on the ground, or the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq—a striking victory over the conventional forces of the Saddam’s regime and the bloody, still on-going, struggle for the hearts and minds that followed.

It is one thing to try to provide a qualitative advantage and increase the proficiency of your soldiers. It is another thing to expect you can wage a war without casualties. Where there is war, there is violence. And where there is violence, there is necessarily a loss of life. To borrow a phrase from Michael Howard’s book *The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War*, Tomahawk cruise missiles may command the skies, but Kalashnikov submachine guns still rule the ground. This suggests there are cases, and perhaps they are in majority, when the material might and technological advantage will not do the trick. In such cases, ‘boots on the ground’ provide the only viable strategy in order attain ones *political* objectives. Motivation of ones troops remains crucial if one is to be victorious. Once again, this brings us to Clausewitz and the superiority of moral over the physical factors in war.

Conclusion

When it comes to stability and international order, I believe that for the majority of people, any kind of political order is acceptable as long as their basic needs and expectations are met. For the most part of human history, these needs and expectations have been quite basic, and though they might have differed on the surface from one society to another, the common denominator of every ruling elite has been the goal to provide security, along with economic and political stability. The greatest enemy of peace and stability is change. Which is why every possible kind of system attempts to establish stabilising mechanisms—every system attempts to perpetuate itself. Western societies are now all peacefully bourgeois. But firstly, bourgeois society is ‘boring’, which means it creates large amounts of (young) people who are educated and have enough time to become bored and dissatisfied with the regime. These societies are thus prone to instability. Secondly, as a product of modernity, western bourgeois societies are spiritually dead, lacking strong foundations and roots in tradition and society, while at the same time, attempting to export their empty, utilitarian, universal and homogenous standard of Humanity around the world, onto a humanity, that is necessarily plural. With a prevalent sense of exceptionalism and without regard for other cultures and traditions, spiritually dead western societies have stirred up the hornet’s nest and are now starting to bear the consequences. They have picked up a lost fight, for the willingness, endeavour and perseverance ascribed to this new form of imperialism is no match for the motivation of people, whose lives, traditions and identities are in danger.

When it comes to the issue of war in the 21st century, it is important to emphasize, that for a Clausewitzian, there can be no such thing as the ‘changing nature of war’. War certainly changes its character that is being reflected in warfare—i.e. the way war is made. However, the nature of war, like the one of a chameleon, always remains the same. One can talk about cyberwar; financial war; war on poverty, drugs, and terrorism; but if the thing one is referring to is not, at the same time, violent, political and interactive, it simply is not ‘war’ but something else.

In general, people—especially the ones from the ‘west’ living in the contemporary era of modernity with an overemphasis on ‘instrumentality’—tend to claim they attempt to get to the bottom of things, to the nature of things that they seek to attain the ‘truth’. Nevertheless, most of the times, it turns out to be more important for them to become familiar with that which is *useful*. The search and claim for higher authority derived from the label of ‘truth’ is

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only secondary, often irrelevant and used rather as a form of legitimizing principle serving a particular political interest and agenda, than as a primary drive promoting our endless efforts towards understanding.

The majority of Clausewitz's readers are fundamentally interested not in understanding Clausewitz but in understanding war as a phenomenon in all of its complexity. Or so would they claim. And when it comes to having profound insights regarding the phenomenon of war—especially the 'western' understanding thereof—*On War* seems to be serving its purpose in a unique, and when it comes to the purpose of *usefulness*, unprecedented way.

As discussed in the beginning of this thesis, the fact that Clausewitz does not attempt to sell a particular program or prescribe universal solutions, but instead aspires to create mind-set, to educate his reader and promote a certain way of thinking makes it seemingly *apolitical*—free of dogma and ideology. This may, on the one hand provide a higher authority and a universal nature and applicability to his theory. However, this 'scientific' approach that gives his theory its legitimacy and credibility presents at the same time perhaps the greatest problem of Clausewitz's theory of war, for his attempt to be scientific and neutral only reflect the contemporary trends of the era of modernity mentioned in various chapters, and thus the theory, when 'getting into wrong hands' ends up serving the political purpose and interests of the contemporary world order.

He attempts to be 'scientific', for he attempts to objectively study the phenomenon of war. Nevertheless, on numerous occasions he has emphasized that war is to be viewed as an *art* rather than a *science*. This, together with his emphasis on the primacy of *moral* over *physical* forces in war, as well as the esoteric and seemingly confusing and contradictory nature of the whole treatise, suggests war has an anti-materialistic, spiritual value, whose true nature is to be contemplated only by the means of combining the theory with a first-hand experience.

Although stemming from, and influenced by, the tradition of the Enlightenment, Clausewitz was himself a realist who rejected the popular view shared by the intellectuals and thinkers of the Enlightenment that depicted war as a relic of history. Maintaining that war presented a natural phenomenon, he also rejected the view of war as a chaotic muddle caused by a mere vanity of political elites. Clausewitz was fascinated by chance and his genius lies precisely in stressing the unpredictability of war along with the introduction of the terms like *friction* and *fog of war* into the discourse. His theory of war embodied in the *wondrous trinity* relies heavily on the concept of *genius* and puts a strong emphasis on (personal) *experience*. This

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only underlies his view on war, as a phenomenon that could not be quantified, i.e. reduced to graphs, numbers governed by some dreamy ideal, law or theory. His war as a continuation of policy by other means stresses war's subordination to the decision made in the realm of the political.

In waging war, the decisions made by the political elite are not superseded by the military establishment, but rather this establishment assumes at the same time takes on the roles and responsibilities of statesmen, meaning it should always conduct its operations with their eyes on the prize – which is not the destruction of the enemy but attainment of the political objective.

In order to do so, the simple prerogative dictates to know oneself and know one's enemy, in order to be able to point out the *centres of gravity*—to run sort of a SWOT analysis and be able to evaluate the *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats* involved in a potential conflict—of both one's own and the those of one's enemy, and thus to be able to choose the appropriate strategy in dealing with the enemy. It appears as if the western societies in the contemporary post-heroic era were failing—especially in the counterinsurgency struggle—precisely on the level of strategy, as a result of wrongly established centres of gravity. This might be also a result of an on-going trend present in the societies of modernity to emphasize physical factors over the moral ones. This applies both to the civilian realm, as well as the one of war.

It appears as if they were waging a wrong war in a wrong battle space. New institutions, new responsibilities and new technology and increased bureaucracy will not do the trick, for, as we know from Clausewitz, these additional enlargements of the military machinery merely increase the possibility of friction – which is already enormous. If you are fighting an enemy who plays a game of soccer, while you prepared for a hockey match, it is either time to find a way to make use of your skates and sticks in this new, alien environment, or simply to put on the soccer cleats and start kicking the ball.

Resumé

Táto práca predstavuje multidisciplinárnu analýzu fenoménu vojny. Spočiatku sa pokúša na daný predmet nazerať prostredníctvom práce Carla von Clausewitza, ktorého dômyselné idey a preniknutie do podstaty fenoménu vojny, prezentované v jeho diele *On War*, predstavujú ako celok významnú paradigmu moderného spôsobu vedenia vojny, ako aj nášho súčasného chápania *umenia* vojny samotného.

Úvod a prvá kapitola pomôže čitateľovi pochopiť, čo motivovalo autora k tomu, že sa rozhodol venovať práve fenoménu vojny. Prvá kapitola má tiež za úlohu pomôcť čitateľovi utvoriť si širší obraz o konflikte, samotnej problematike vojny, ako aj o vzťahoch medzi vojnou a človekom, vojnou a spoločnosťou, či vojnou a medzinárodným systémom. Prvá kapitola čitateľa oboznamuje so základnými definíciami a konceptmi. Čitateľ má možnosť oboznámiť sa so základnými predpokladmi, z ktorých vychádzal autor pri písaní práce, a dokáže tak lepšie pochopiť myšlienky autora a celkové ladenie bakalárskej práce. Záverečná časť prvej kapitoly sa snaží priblížiť osobu Carla von Clausewitza a teda vysvetliť, prečo má jeho dielo centrálnu postavu v bakalárskej práci.

Druhá kapitola prechádza od všeobecných konceptov, definícií, úvah a implikácií, k definíciám a konceptom samotného Carla von Clausewitza v diele *On War*. V tejto kapitole je čitateľ oboznámený s Clausewitzovým slávnym výrokom, v ktorom označil vojnu za pokračovanie politiky inými prostriedkami. Kapitola si kladie za úlohu vyvrátiť prevládajúce misinterpretácie, resp. zdanlivo negatívne implikácie tejto slávnej definície a vysvetľuje, prečo Clausewitz kladol taký dôraz na podriadené postavenie vojny a celého vojenského aparátu voči politickej sfére a politickým rozhodnutiam. Ďalej je čitateľ oboznámený s kľúčovými konceptmi ako *friction* (trenie) a *fog of war* (hmla vojny). Tieto koncepty kladú dôraz na úlohu náhody, nemožnosť predvídať úmysel a reakciu nepriateľa, ako aj nepredvídateľnosť vojny samotnej, nakoľko pozostáva z množstva faktorov, ktoré spôsobujú “trenie”. A to má za následok, že výsledok, predstavy a očakávania ľudí nezodpovedajú realite. Nejasnosť informácií vo vojne, spolu s konceptmi *friction* a *fog of war*, počiarkujú, že Clausewitz vidí vojnu skôr ako umenie, než ako *vedu*. Považuje ju za nemerateľnú, komplikovanú a nepredvídateľnú. Dôležité postavenie v Clausewitzovej teórii vojny preto zohráva koncept *génia*, teda človeka, ktorý je schopný pomocou tréningu, štúdia a osobnej skúsenosti na bojisku znížiť “trenie”, “vidieť v hmle” a byť prezieravým veliteľom, ktorý má predstavu o tom, ako docieľiť vytýčený politický cieľ.

Tretia kapitola oboznamuje čitateľa s konceptom “vznešenej trojice” (magnificent trinity), ktorý zväzuje dohromady Clausewitzove koncepty a tvorí centrálnu časť, ktorá je v podstate aj akýmsi zhrnutím Clausewitzovej teórie vojny. *Trojica* predstavuje syntézu Clausewitzovej duálnej definície vojny, a teda dvoch základných aspektov vojny. Predstavuje vojnu ako čosi viac než *len* manifestáciu surovej sily a zároveň tiež niečo iné ako *len* prostriedok racionálneho konania a politiky. Táto podivuhodná trojica pozostáva z dynamickej, prirodzene nestabilnej interakcie medzi silami *násilnej emócie, racionálnej kalkulácie a hrou náhody*. Ako je známe už z abstraktu, táto práca si stanovila za svoj hlavný cieľ overiť platnosť a relevantnosť Clausewitzovej paradigmy v súčasnom svete, v kontexte meniaceho sa charakteru vojny a ozbrojeného konfliktu. Konkrétne v kontexte globálneho posunu od *moderného* ku *postmodernému* konfliktu, pre ktorý sú charakteristické podmienky *hypermoderného* spôsobu vedenia vojny ovplyvneného pokrokom vo vede a technológiách, predovšetkým však vynálezom nukleárných zbraní, ktoré so sebou priniesli možnosť absolútneho nukleárneho holokaustu. Posun od *moderného* k *postmodernému* konfliktu je tiež charakterizovaný podmienkami, ktoré vznikajú akoby v opozícii k modernému spôsobu vedenia vojny. To ma za následok, že počet *vnútroštátnych* konfliktov s nízkou intenzitou asymetrického spôsobu boja rastie, zatiaľ čo počet *medzištátnych* konfliktov s vysokou intenzitou, prebiehajúcich medzi riadnymi, regulárnymi ozbrojenými jednotkami, klesá. Teória vojny obsiahnutá v *trojici* je natoľko všeobecná a flexibilná, že ju možno bez problémov aplikovať na pravdepodobne akýkoľvek vojnový konflikt medzi ľuďmi (to zodpovedá Clausewitzovej definícii vojny) odohrávajúc sa v akejkoľvek dobe bez ohľadu na jej technologickú vyspelosť. Tretia kapitola teda dokazuje aplikovateľnosť Clausewitzovej *trojice* a teórie vojny v prostredí *hypermoderného* spôsobu vedenia vojny, ako aj v prostredí tzv. *protimoderného* spôsobu vedenia vojny. Ku koncu tretej kapitoly sa dostávame k problematike *prostriedkov* a *cieľov*, ako aj k zásadnému rozdeleniu medzi *fyzickými* a *morálnymi* aspektmi vojny. Táto časť skúma nadradenosť morálnych aspektov nad fyzickými. Pojednáva napríklad o možných výhodách vysokomotivovaných jednotiek nad dobre vyzbrojenými, ale nedostatočne motivovanými jednotkami. Tiež sa zameriava na to, ako jednotlivé štáty a spoločnosti kladú rozdielny dôraz na rôzne ciele, respektíve za dôležité ciele - pre ktoré sa oplatí ísť do vojny, bojovať a položiť život - považujú rozličné veci. Aj tento fenomén prispieva k nepredvídateľnému charakteru vojny a k tomu, že vojna vzniká aj z nepredvídateľných situácií. Dôležitým faktorom ostáva poznať seba i svojho nepriateľa.

Druhým cieľom práce bolo preskúmať spôsob, akým vojna a jej chápanie ovplyvňuje ustanovenie súčasného svetového poriadku a svetového poriadku vo všeobecnosti. Štvrtá kapitola sa preto zameriava na sociologicko-historický prierez a skúma meniaci sa charakter

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vojny, meniace sa vnímanie vojny a skúma dialektiku medzi charakterom vojny, jej vnímaním, konštrukciou štátu a ich dopadom na medzinárodný systém. Preto sa úvod štvrtej kapitoly odvoláva prevažne na prácu Charlesa Tillyho *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, predovšetkým na jej tretiu kapitolu *How War Made States, and Vice Versa* (Tilly, 1993, pp. 67-95), ako aj knihu Michaela Howarda *The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War*. Cez socio-historický prierez sa štvrtá kapitola dostáva až ku Clausewitzovi, ktorého paradigma je tak zasadená do širšieho kontextu. Clausewitzovo dielo dokonale odzrkadľuje dobu, v ktorej žil. Jeho práca však obsahuje mnoho filozofických prvkov. Ako jeden z mála pozorovateľov francúzskej revolúcie si všíma a uvedomuje dôležitosť nových fenoménov, ako sú nacionalizmus, vojnová propaganda a masová mobilizácia, ktoré zásadným spôsobom menia charakter vojny.

Clausewitz definoval vojnu ako pokračovanie politiky inými prostriedkami, ale sám sa príliš nezaoberal tým, čo *politika* je. Štvrtá kapitola nazerá na Clausewitzovu teóriu vojny cez prizmu politickej teórie Carla Schmitta (ktorý Clausewitzu čítal) a zasadzuje ju tak do širšieho kontextu medzinárodných vzťahov, medzinárodného konfliktu a interpretuje mocenské záujmy dominantných politických zoskupení v súčasnom medzinárodnom systéme. Táto časť sa zaoberá najmä *posunom k diskriminujúcemu konceptu vojny*, ktorý prichádza do sféry medzinárodných vzťahov po prvej svetovej vojne a má za účel očierniť a kriminalizovať samotné vedenie vojny, ako aj štáty, ktoré sa prostredníctvom vojny rozhodnú meniť status quo.

Záverečná kapitola prináša na základe celkovej syntézy teoretických, historických, sociologických, ako aj filozofických a metafyzických aspektov súvisiacich s fenoménom vojny kritický komentár súčasnej situácie a pokúša sa prispieť do diskusie o politike, bezpečnosti a medzinárodných vzťahov niekoľkými, síce skromnými, no podstatnými názormi a prognózami. Najväčší problém vidí autor v inštrumentálnom chápaní vojny, ktoré v súčasnosti prevláda v západnom svete. Za túto situáciu nesie určitý diel zodpovednosti aj samotný Clausewitz, resp. jeho misinterpretácia. Autor tejto práce vidí problém tiež v preceňovaní fyzických, teda materiálnych faktorov na úkor faktorov morálnych, ktorého negatívne dôsledky v súčasnosti badať v spôsobe, akým sa západná spoločnosť vysporiadava s hrozbou terorizmu, a ako vedie (nie príliš úspešne) operácie proti rebelom, separatistom a iným radikálnym zložkám (napríklad v Iraku alebo Afganistane). Tento fenomén má čo do činenia s "etnocentrizmom" západných spoločností, resp. s ich neschopnosťou (a neochotou) rešpektovať diametrálne odlišné kultúry. Táto neschopnosť a neochota má však za následok to, že západný svet so svojím inštrumentálnym chápaním vojny nie je schopný a ochotný

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porozumieť iným metafyzickým konštrukciám tohto fenoménu, a v prípade (otvoreného) konfliktu sa ocitá v značne znevýhodnenom postavení. Napríklad v neschopnosti zmieriť sa so stratami na životoch. Zdá sa, že jedinou cestou, ako tento problém riešiť, je snažiť sa lepšie spoznať samého seba a svoje ciele, ako aj spoznať ciele, charakter a zmýšľanie svojho protivníka.

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